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The Special Tribunal for Lebanon:
A Defense Perspective
Charles Chernor Jalloh*
ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes the absence of organs tasked with
guaranteeingthe rights of the defense in internationalcriminal
law. It explains the historical origins of the problem, tracing it
back to the genesis of modern prosecutions at the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal. It then explains how the
organizational charts of the UN courts for the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone omitted the defense and
essentially treated it as a second class citizen before the eyes of
the law. This sets the stage for the author to show why the
creation of the first full-fledged defense organ in international
criminal law by the UN-backed Special Tribunalfor Lebanon is
a welcome advance in the maturing of international penal
tribunals from primitive to more civilized institutions. The
Article argues that if the legal provision contained in the
Lebanon Tribunal statute is matched with the independence
and resources needed to help realize defendant rights, it will
likely become one of the statute's biggest legacies to
internationallaw.
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courts, including as the Legal Advisor to the Office of the Principal Defender, Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Associate Legal Officer in the Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and a Visiting Professional in the Office of
the Public Counsel for the Defense at the International Criminal Court. His most
recent work is THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR
AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2013). E-
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I. INTRODUCTION

As the most recent UN-sponsored ad hoc criminal tribunal, the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL or Tribunal) has attracted the
attention of the international community. Though it has yet to
conclude its first case, the STL has already been lauded (and also
criticized) for various features in its founding instruments.1 The
positive reviews of the STL stem from several factors. 2
First, it was established following a request by the government
of Lebanon for international community assistance to address a
situation that the national authorities could not, for various reasons,
resolve under the domestic legal system. Lebanon's appeal for UN
support to establish a tribunal of "international character" to bring
to justice those responsible for terrorism, much like the requests for
international support from the governments of Cambodia in 1997 and
Sierra Leone in 2000, is a noteworthy departure from the traditional
foot dragging of states in prosecuting individuals for egregious
international crimes that essentially became the norm between the
creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945

See, e.g., C~cile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special
1.
Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1108 (2007) (introducing various
features of the STL); Paola Gaeta, To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials in
Absentia Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1165, 1166
(2007) (discussing the STL's "remarkable" feature of trials in absentia); Gillian
Higgins, Fair and Expeditious Pre-Trial Proceedings: The Future of International
Criminal Tribunals, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 394, 397 (2007) (comparing and contrasting
the STL with other international criminal tribunals); Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The SubjectMatter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1125,
1138 (2007) (noting positive aspects of the Lebanese definition of terrorism); Choucri
Sader, A Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1083, 1088 (2007) (describing innovations of the STL); Bert Swart, Cooperation
Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1153, 1155
(2007) (describing the addition of the Office of Defense as a "highly remarkable and
welcome" development); Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar & Lynn Maalouf, Early
Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1065, 1078-80 (2007) (noting in particular the positive
legacy the STL may leave in Lebanon and also the addition of the Office of Defense).
Two leading journals have published special issues on the Lebanon
2.
Tribunal offering generally positive commentary on its possibilities and likely
challenges (volumes 5 and 7 of the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE and
volume 21 of the LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW).
Letter from Ibrahim Assaf, Charg6 d'affaires ad iterim of the Permanent
3.
Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General (Dec. 13, 2005)
[hereinafter Assaf Letter Dec. 131; S.C. Res. 1644, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15,
2005). Cf. William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a 'Tribunal of an
InternationalCharacter'Equivalent to an 'InternationalCriminal Court'?, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 513 (2008) (discussing whether the STL must observe sovereign immunity in
the same manner as the other three UN criminal tribunals).
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and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) in the early
1990s. 4
Second, the legal basis of the Tribunal is a consensual treaty
between the United Nations and Lebanon. 5 This arrangement
enabled the national authorities to help shape the legal nature and
structure of the STL. Save the fact that the country ultimately sought
Security Council Chapter VII action to bring the bilateral treaty with
the United Nations into force, which has led to the argument that the
Tribunal's basis has changed from a consensual treaty to a forceful
Chapter VII imposition, 6 Lebanon played a significant role by
initially requesting the STL's establishment and subsequently
engaging in negotiations with the United Nations to conclude the
Tribunal's constitutive instrument.7 The end product, which provides
for strong national participation, reflects this involvement. For
example, Lebanon has the power to appoint or nominate key officials,

4.
The cooperation between the Lebanese and the United Nations is
particularly noteworthy with regard to the early investigations and information
sharing between the UN and Lebanese authorities. See Swart, supra note 1, at 115556.
See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on
5.
the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N.-Leb., art. 3(3), Jan. 29,
2007, 2461 U.N.T.S. 280, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter
Agreement] (establishing the STL), S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757, at 12-22
(May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute] (providing that the Agreement shall enter
into force).
6.
Although Resolution 1757 overrode Lebanese Constitutional procedures, "in
so doing it has provided a solution for an impossible political situation and laid a claim
for the rule of law to prevail over violence." Nadim Shehadi & Elizabeth Wilmshurt,
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on Trial?, CHATHAM HOUSE 2 (July 2007),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ResearchlMiddle%2East/bpO7O
7lebanon.pdf [http://perma.cc/54MJ-MRPJ] (archived Feb. 25, 2014). For discussion of
the treaty-based nature of the STL, see Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the
InternationalLegality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1091,
1098 (2007). But see Sader, supra note 1, at 1084 (arguing that the Tribunal is
constitutional because it was formed in "compliance with the law" which includes
foreign law and international law).
7.
See Letter from Nawaf Salam, Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the
United Nations, to the Secretary-General (Dec. 4, 2008) (expressing hope that an
international tribunal will be formed); Assaf Letter Dec. 13, supra note 3 (requesting
the creation of an international tribunal); Letter from Ibrahim Assaf, Charg6 d'affaires
ad iterim. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, to the
Secretary-General (Dec. 5, 2005) (calling for an extension of the investigation in to the
assassination of Prime Minister Al-Hariri); Letter from Ibrahim Assaf, Charg6
d'affaires ad iterim of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, to the
Secretary-General (Oct. 14, 2005); Letter from Ibrahim Assaf, Charg6 d'affaires ad
iterim of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, to the SecretaryGeneral (Mar. 29, 2005) (requesting an investigation into the assassination of Prime
Minister Al-Hariri).
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such as judges and the deputy prosecutor.8 This same spirit of
cooperation influenced a similar governmental role in a close sibling,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), although it is less involved
than the high degree of national control that Phnom Penh
successfully negotiated with New York in relation to the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).9
Third, although since the end of the Cold War there have been
various types of "hybrid"1 0 courts which incorporated aspects of
national law into their constitutive instruments, the STL is the first
internationalized criminal tribunal" with an exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over domestic-instead of international-crimes.1 2 In this
way, the establishment of the Tribunal symbolically completes the
anti-impunity circle, which now consists of limited national
prosecutions within domestic courts using international law (for
example, in Belgium and France); purely international prosecutions
using only international law (ICTY, ICTR, and International
Criminal Court (ICC)); 'mixed' or 'hybrid' court prosecutions based on
a cocktail of international and national law (East Timor, Sierra
Leone, Cambodia, and Kosovo/Bosnia); and internationalized

8.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at arts. 3(3), 2(5) (giving the Lebanese
government the power to consult with the secretary-general on the appointment of
judges and a deputy prosecutor).
9.
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/cabinet/law/4/Krlawas-amended27_oct_2004_Eng.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5QY
U-53WZ] (archived Mar. 6, 2014).
10.
Hybrid refers to a "thing made by combining two different elements";
national is an adjective meaning "of, relating to, or characteristic of a nation; owned,
controlled, or financially supported by the state" and international an adjective
meaning "existing or occurring between nations; agreed on by all or many nations; used
by people of many nations." 10 CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (Judy Pearsall ed., 1999).
Hybrid tribunals have been set up for East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia. See Schabas, supra note 3, at 523 (distinguishing between international and
internationalized tribunals); Swart, supra note 1, at 1155-56 (noting that the STL has
primacy over domestic courts on crimes within its jurisdiction).
11.
While the Iraqi Tribunal was described as an internationalized domestic
tribunal, I consider that to be a product of a domestic process.
12.
See, e.g., Jurdi, supra note 1, at 1126-27 (noting the absence of reference to
international crimes); see also STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 2, which limits
Applicable Criminal Law as follows:
The following shall be applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the
crimes referred to in article 1, subject to the provisions of this Statute: (a) The
provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal
integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including
the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal participation
and conspiracy; and (b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January
1958 on "Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith
struggle."

770

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 47-765

prosecutions using purely municipal law within an internationally
supported or international court (Lebanon).' 3
Fourth, the Tribunal seems set to help reduce the common law
bias of international criminal courts. It does so by importing
important civil law elements14 that may have the effect of obviating
some of the undesirable side effects of the common law based
adversarial system predominant in most international penal courts.
These elements include specific procedural laws and an augmented
role for judges from the passive "cymbal"' 5 role of the common law
tradition toward a more active, inquisitorial role familiar to civil law
legal systems. In the latter, judges are generally given greater control
over the proceedings. And, in the search for the truth, they take
priority in the examination of witnesses, have proprio motu powers to
call additional witnesses, and enjoy entrenched authority to issue
orders for production of additional evidence.' 6 Some of these

13.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 2 (referring to only Lebanese law as
applicable law).
14.
See Aptel, supra note 1, at 1116 (explaining how "the adoption of several
characteristics of the Romano Germanic criminal systems . . . the merging of aspects of
both the civil and common law procedures goes further when compared with any of the
other international or hybrid criminal jurisdictions"); James Cockayne, The Special
Tribunalfor Lebanon - A Cripple from Birth?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1161, 1064 (2007)
(describing how the STL could contribute to international criminal law "by
demonstrating the feasibility of a more streamlined, perhaps more inquisitorial
international criminal procedure"); Sader, supra note 1, at 1088 (noting how the
merging of the two traditions will drastically improve efficiency of international
criminal procedure); see also Guenael Mettraux, The Internationalizationof Domestic
Jurisdictionsby International Tribunals;The Special Tribunalfor Lebanon Renders Its
First Decisions, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 911, 921 (2009) (describing how in one of the
STL's first decisions, the pre-trial judge took a posture consistent with the civil law
tradition). For insight into how the ECCC have injected civil law elements into
international criminal prosecutions, see Guido Acquaviva, New Paths in International
Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the Cambodian ExtraordinaryChambers, 6 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 129 (2008).

15.
See Sir Francis Bacon, Of Judicature, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON,
LORD CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND 58 (1844) ("[A]n over-speaking judge is no well-tuned
cymbal.").
16.
This represents a return to Nuremberg. See Richard May & Marieke
Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague,
and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 727-29 (1999). One key difference
between adversarial and inquisitorial systems is that in the latter, especially in
criminal cases, judges play a more active role in structuring cases, calling evidence,
and so on. In common law systems, the judges play the reverse role and are expected to
be passive while the parties marshal and present evidence to convince the judges to
rule one way or another. Another key difference is the role of precedent. See generally
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 20(2)-(3) (giving the judge the power to question
witnesses and motion for additional witnesses); Kai Ambos, International Criminal
Procedure: 'Adversarial,""Inquisitorial"or Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 34 (2003)
(discussing how some civil courts can decline to apply precedent). For discussions of the
judge's uniquely inquisitorial role in examining evidence, see Aptel, supra note 1, at
1118-20; Kate Gibson & Daniella Rudy, A New Model of International Criminal
Procedure? The Progress of the Duch Trial at the ECCC, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1005,
1009 (2009). While the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that witnesses will be
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functions, although also theoretically available in a common law
courtroom, are typically exercised by the adversarial parties instead
of by the judges.' 7
These changes to the neutral arbiter role are further enhanced
by a provision for a standing pretrial judge.' 8 The pretrial judge is
tasked with reviewing and approving indictments when the
prosecution presents evidence of a prima facie case that someone
appears to have committed a crime that is within the Tribunal's
jurisdiction." The pretrial judge can also issue any other orders that
would facilitate prosecutorial investigations. 20 Thus, he or she plays
an important role in ensuring the efficient conduct of proceedings
without the additional responsibilities that would accrue from formal
membership in a particular trial chamber-as is the case in other ad
hoc international criminal courts. Overall, this appears to represent a
shift in the occupancy of the driver's seat. The move pushes the
adversarial parties (i.e., the prosecution and the defense) to the side
in favor of putting the judges at the center of the justice-seeking
process. The practical consequence could be significant. The trial,
instead of being shaped to reflect the position most favorable to the
parties' particular interests, becomes primarily concerned with
discerning the truth and dispensing evenhanded justice. 2'
Other notable features of the STL include the fact that it is
empowered to hold trials in absentia (albeit under strict conditions)
and that it provides for greater victim participation in proceedings

questioned first by the presiding judge, seemingly a more inquisitorial order, the
presentation of evidence follows the adversarial model. That is, evidence will be
provided first by the prosecutor, then by the trial chamber unless the trial chamber
directs otherwise. See Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
r. 145, 146(B), amended Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.stl-tsL.org/images/RPEl
STLRulesofProcedureandEvidenceEnRev2.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GG5J-KUMT]
(archived Mar. 6, 2014) [hereinafter RPE].
17.
As we shall see later, notions such as the admission of written evidence; the
prospect of an accused to make a statement during trial; the use of in absentia trials;
and the employment of a single trial to establish both the guilt or innocence of an
accused and any sentence that may be imposed are some of the core elements bringing
the Tribunal closer to the inquisitorial system. See Special Tribunal of Lebanon,
Explanatory Memorandum from the President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON,
3-4 (Apr. 12,
2012), http://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?option=comk2&Itemid=287&id=1210 d4590de
8b8d6fbd42dbe2f6e3a6Oc2d5&lang=en&task=download&view=item
[http://perma.cc/
R4RC-K2G6] (archived Mar. 6, 2014).
18.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 18 (providing that the pre-trial judge
will review the indictment).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
See Aptel, supra note 1, at 1123 (noting that the inclusion of civil law
elements "probably results from the intention to create a legal mechanism duly
inspired by and respectful of the legal tradition of the country directly concernedLebanon-as well as by the participation in the negotiation leading to the adoption of
the Statute of many protagonists experienced in this tradition"); see also Ambos, supra
note 16, at 4 (discussing the inquisitorial system's truth-seeking nature).
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vis-A-vis the current UN-sponsored ad hoc courts (though not as great
as in the regime applicable in the ICC). 22 It is comprised of a mixed
Lebanese and international staff (including judges and prosecutors),
and it is expected to apply the highest due process standards. 23 This
overrides harsher punishments such as the death penalty and forced
labor. Both of the latter are known to apply to anyone convicted of
similar crimes under Lebanese law.
But, despite all these positive elements, already less discussed in
the nascent literature is another significant feature of the Lebanon
Tribunal. 24 This was its creation of the first autonomous defense
organ with the principal responsibility of protecting the rights of the
accused and the defense in the history of international criminal
courts. The establishment of the Defense Office as a full-fledged
organ in the Statute of the STL builds a superstructure onto the
skeletal foundation first laid by the semiautonomous Office of the
Principal Defender (OPD) in the SCSL, where this author had the
honor to serve as a legal advisor. 25 The STL's provision of an
independent Defense Office is unique and confers on it, in the true
spirit of "equality of arms," a legal status coequal to that of the
prosecution. Though the lawyers for the suspects and defendants will
come from the private bar, instead of the office as such, this
unprecedented step of a full fledged mechanism for protection of the
defense rights in international criminal law contrasts favorably with
the routine second-or perhaps even third-class treatment that the

22.
At the ICC, victims do not only enjoy formal standing to participate in the
proceedings, including the right to representation by counsel, there is also a Trust
Fund for Victims and an entitlement to reparations. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court arts. 68, 75, 79, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
23.
The Security Council resolution authorizing the creation of the Court, the
preamble to the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic,
and the Statute of the Tribunal all affirmed that the Tribunal shall operate with the
"highest international standards of justice."
24.
There appears to be a growing body of literature on the STL. See supra text
accompanying note 2. For a noteworthy discussion of the innovation of the Defense
Office, see Aptel, supra note 1; see also Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Defending the
Defenders: The Role of Defence Counsel in International Criminal Trials, 8 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 463, 483-86 (2010); Matthew Gillett & Matthias Schuster, The Special
Tribunal for Lebanon Kicks Off: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Swiftly Adopts Its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 885 (2009) (discussing the
general mechanisms and procedures under the STL Statute); Mettraux, supra note 14;
Richard J. Wilson, 'Emaciated'Defense Or a Trend to Independence and Equality of
Arms in InternationalizedCriminal Tribunals, 15 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 6 (2008); Wierda,
supra note 1, at 1080.
25.
The use of the name "Defense Office" rather than OPD, which would have
mirrored the prosecutorial institution's names in this and other tribunals, is more
accurate. Francois Roux is the current head of the office, but he, unlike the prosecutor,
is not principal counsel. See Part VIA, infra, including the discussion of the
distinctions between the defense and prosecution at the STL.
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defense has received in other international or internationalized
criminal courts.
This Article seeks to highlight the uniqueness of the Defense
Office in the STL and its potential significance for the development of
international criminal justice institutions. Part II begins with an
overview of the origins of the STL. Part III will then examine the
evolution and status of the defense in international criminal courts
that preceded the Tribunal, focusing on the innovations of the SCSL's
OPD, which inspired the Defense Office in the Lebanon Tribunal.
Part IV will then compare the mandate of the new office with its
predecessor in the Sierra Leone Court to highlight its important
promise. The Article argues that, provided certain important
conditions are fulfilled, the Defense Office of the STL appears set to
catapult the rights of the accused and the defense in international
criminal proceedings to a new and unprecedented level. This will
ultimately benefit not only the accused and the defense in that
particular international court, but also the fledgling international
criminal justice system as a whole.
Drawing upon the experiences of the SCSL, the Article
anticipates some of the key challenges for the STL Defense Office and
suggests that there have already been some good practical
approaches toward their resolution. This is important because, much
like its predecessor, the new office will be watched closely. Thus, its
success would likely reinforce, while correspondingly its failure would
likely undermine, the case for the routine inclusion of an independent
defense organ in the constitutive instruments of future international
criminal tribunals set up by the United Nations and its Member
States.
Finally, the Conclusion underscores the need for the STL's
principled commitment to a greater equality of arms between
prosecution and defense reflected in the founding instruments to be
put in practice. This, at a minimum, will entail endowing the office
with the functional independence and resources necessary to enable it
to provide proper financial, administrative, logistical, legal (including
investigative and witness tracking), and other support for the
defense. These will be crucial for the Defense Office envisaged in the
Statute of the STL to realize its full potential for Lebanon as well as
the international community.

II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

A. Lebanon Wants a Court but Needs International
Help to Create It
On December 13, 2005, Fuad Siniora, the Lebanese prime
minister, wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requesting

774

VANDERBILTIOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 47765

international support "to establish a tribunal of an international
character to convene in or outside Lebanon, to try all those who are
found responsible for the terrorist crime perpetrated against Prime
Minister [Rafiq] Hariri." 26 The then premier, along with twenty-one
others, was assassinated in Beirut, the Lebanese capital, on February
14, 2005.27
The Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations (Charter), adopted Resolution 1644. That instrument
requested the secretary-general to advise on "the nature and scope of
the international assistance needed" to establish the Tribunal. 28 After
initial consultations with Lebanese authorities and additional
meetings of legal experts representing the parties in New York and
The Hague, the secretary-general presented a report to the Council
on November 15, 2006.29 Annexed to the report was a draft

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on
the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon and a proposed
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 30
The Council subsequently adopted Resolution 1664.31 That
resolution, which was not rooted in Chapter VII, which furnishes the
Charter's most decisive authority, welcomed among other things "the
common understanding reached between the [UN] Secretariat and
the Lebanese authorities on the key issues regarding the
establishment and the main features of a possible tribunal;"
reiterated the Council's determination "to assist Lebanon in the
search for the truth and in holding all those involved in [the] terrorist
attack accountable"; and requested that the secretary-general
negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese Government "aimed at
establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the
highest international standards of criminal justice."3 2

26.
Assaf Letter Dec. 13, supra note 3.
27.
The UN Report listed all twenty-one victims: Zahi Abou-Rjeyleh, Yehya AlArab, Mohammed Al-Ghalayini, Abdul Hamid Al-Ghalayini, Mahmoud Saleh AlKhalaf, Sobhi Al-Khodr, Omar Al-Masri, Mahmoud Hamad Al-Mohammad, Joseph
Aoun, Alaa Asfour, Rima Bazzi, Abdu Bou-Farah, Mazen Dahabi, Yamama Damen,
Mohammed Darweesh, Bassel Fouleyhan, Rawad Haydar, Farhan Issa, Talal Nasser,
Haytham Ousman, and Ziad Tarraf. The report also noted that an unidentified body
was found. Third Rep. of the Int'l Indep. Investigation Comm'n EstablishedPursuant to
Security Council Resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), transmitted by
letter dated Mar. 14, 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of
the Security Council, 14, U.N. Doc. S/2006/161 (Mar. 14, 2006).
28.
S.C. Res. 1644, supra note 3.
29.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General,
Report].
See id. at 15-33 (containing the draft).
30.
31.
S.C. Res. 1664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
Id.
32.
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Jorge Voto-Bernales, then president of the Council, next wrote to
the secretary-general on November 24, 2006, supporting the report.33
He requested finalization of the negotiated agreement with Lebanon
in a manner consistent with the country's constitution.3 4 Importantly,
President Voto-Bernales also notified the secretary-general that the
Council wished for the Tribunal to be funded through voluntary
contributions from interested states (at 51 percent) with Lebanon to
bear the remainder (49 percent) of the expenses. 5 The Council had
acceded to the secretary-general's recommendation that the Tribunal
begin operations once funding for its formal establishment and the
first year of operations had been secured and additional funds
pledged by donors for the second and third years of its work.36 This
recommendation arose from the secretary-general's direct experience
with the Sierra Leone Court.37 The latter was the first ad hoc
international penal court to be funded solely by donations from other
countries. The effort to be sure that there is money in the bank before
the work begins has since become the secretary-general's practice to
ensure that these voluntarily funded courts, including the STL, will
only begin to operate once there is sufficient funds to do so. Despite
this policy, it is common knowledge that the Sierra Leone Tribunal
suffered from a lack of money throughout its existence. At various
points, it even had to rely on subvention grants from the UN budget
to ensure continuity with its operations. This fate may be avoided by
the STL because of the simple reason that Lebanon, unlike Sierra
Leone, appears to be willing and able to cover some of the expenses
associated with this ad hoc court. This may partly be a result of the
different situations that they each address: the former in respect of a
single incident involving some killings (where the state remains
intact) and the latter in respect of a conflict that lasted for several
years (where the state was tethering on the brink of collapse).
The constitutive treaty, to which the statute was an annexure,
was subsequently signed by Lebanon on January 22, 2007, and by the
United Nations on February 6, 2007.38 It envisaged entry into force,
pursuant to Article 19(1), a day after the date the Lebanese

33.
Letter from Jorge Voto-Bernales, President of the Security Council, to the
Secretary-General (Nov. 21, 2006), U.N. Doc. S/2006/911 (Nov. 24, 2006).
34.
See id. (requesting finalization of the Agreement and setting out the
funding for the tribunal).
35.

Id.

36.
Id.
37.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 70, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) (noting that relying solely on
voluntary contributions would not provide adequate funding); see also id. 1 45
(discussing the merits of assessed contributions).
38.

See UNITED

NATIONs TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/

showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028005eOe7
[http://perma.cc/3SCV-PY63]
Feb. 26, 2014) (displaying the dates and locations of signings).

(archived
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authorities notified the United Nations that the legal requirements
for entry into force under its domestic law had been fulfilled.39
B. Lebanese Politics Gets in the Way, UN Imposes the
Tribunal as a Matter of InternationalLaw
Despite the apparent prior agreement or understanding, in an
interesting twist, the four months that followed the signature of the
bilateral treaty between the United Nations and Lebanon were
characterized by negotiation, controversy, and, ultimately, deadlock
as political parties and other opposition groups contested the
establishment of the STL. 40 The Lebanese government thereafter
notified the United Nations that it could not ratify the agreement or
domesticate the Statute creating the Tribunal, as required under the
constitution, though it apparently had the parliamentary majority to
do so. 4 1 This was a result of the speaker of parliament's refusal to
convene a session of the relevant legislative body to formally vote on
the two draft-ratifying instruments. 42 As a result of this procedural
block, Prime Minister Siniora advised the secretary-general on the
impasse with two key observations.
First, in the Lebanese government's view, the fact that there was
little prospect of a parliamentary session to complete formal
ratification meant that "the domestic route to ratification had reached
a dead end." Second, "despite their stated support for the
establishment of a Tribunal, the opposition [had] declined to discuss"
their reservations on the agreed statutes with UN legal adviser
Nicolas Michel. 43 The UN legal counsel had visited Beirut in April
2007 in a last-minute attempt to end the stalemate. Consequently,
Lebanon requested that the Council adopt a "binding decision" that
would make the STL a "reality."4 4
In his forwarding cover note of that request, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon concurred that "domestic options" for ratification had
been "exhausted."45 He thereby, at least implicitly, endorsed the

39.
Article 19(1) of the Agreement provides: "This Agreement shall enter into
force on the day after the Government has notified the United Nations in writing that
the legal requirements for entry into force have been complied with." Agreement, supra
note 5, at art. 19(1).
40.
See Sader, supra note 1, at 1083-84 (highlighting the debate over the
constitutionality of the tribunal).
41.
See Letter from Fouad Siniora, Prime Minister of Lebanon, to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2007/281, Annex (May 14, 2007) (discussing the refusal
by the speaker of parliament to convene a session to ratify the tribunal).
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter from the U.N. Secretary-General dated May
15, 2007 addressed to the President of the Security Council (May 16, 2007), availableat
http://www.stl-tsL.org/index.php?option=com-k2&Itemid=350&id=1342 0370e4708e72f
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government's request for the Council to adopt a Chapter VII decision.
There was no public discussion by either the Lebanese authorities or
the secretary-general of the possible legal and political ramifications
of such a request for Lebanon and or other UN Member States. This
may be for several reasons. The most plausible would appear to be
the presence of the consent of the government of the concerned state.
After all, the Siniora government had sought the UN support for the
court to be created in the first place. Furthermore, it was now
explicitly requesting use of Chapter VII. In such circumstances, it
seems hard to worry about the possible impact on Lebanese
sovereignty of imposing the court as an enforcement measure. The
party most likely to protest that had essentially conceded the point.
And, in any event, such an approach might engender a change in the
legal nature of the Tribunal, making it an international court as
opposed to one that is merely bearing an internationalcharacter.
The Council's response was swift. On May 25, 2007, it adopted
Resolution 1757 promulgating a condition that purported to bring
into force by June 10, 2007, (within ten working days) the bilateral
treaty establishing the STL, unless the Lebanese Government
notified its compliance with Article 19(1) of the UN-Lebanon
Agreement. 4 6 One might have thought that this would strengthen the
government's hand with the opposition parties to remove the
procedural obstacles and pass the laws incorporating the treaty,
consistent with the country's basic law. This would after all have
given greater symbolic power to the national authorities. It was not to
be. As seemed more likely in light of the Siniora government's
reading of the political controversies associated with the Tribunal
within the country, notification was not provided by June 10, 2007.
Thus, by operation of the condition contained in the resolution, the
agreement and its annexed statute were deemed to have entered into
force as of that date.
This approach, which was roundly criticized by five of fifteen
Council members that abstained from voting on Resolution 1757, is
unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. 4 7 Although

08b04fe653bd9c367ac&lang=fr&task=download&view=item
[http://perma.cc/4NJMYX89] (archived Mar. 6, 2014) ("[A]ll domestic options for the ratification of the Special
Tribunal now appear to be exhausted. . . .").
46.
Agreement, supra note 5, 1(a).
47.
Qatar's representative at the Security Council criticized that the resolution
"entail[ed] legal encroachments known to all." South Africa's representative noted that
such a measure could "politicize international criminal law, thereby undermining the
very foundations of international law." In addition to Qatar and South Africa,
Indonesia, China, and Russia abstained. See U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5685th mtg. at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007) (containing minutes for Security Council meeting
on Resolution 1757); Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council
Authorizes Establishment of Special Tribunal to Try Suspects in Assassination of Rafiq
Hariri (May 30, 2007) (reporting the reaction of Member States on the passing of
Resolution 1757); see also Fr6ddric M6gret, A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN
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apparently triggered by a request from the Lebanese government, the
actual entry into force of the bilateral treaty profoundly implicates
the interests of many UN Member States if it is seen as a precedent
for imposition of an international instrument on an unwilling state, a
sort of legislative act on the part of the Council, with the effect of
overriding national sovereignty. A key concern is that the Council can
now seemingly invoke its most robust power to help a government
circumvent its own national constitutional requirements. Yet the
collective security regime envisaged by the Charter and the
Westphalian sovereignty-based international law system assumes
consent to be a sine qua non, with only limited exceptions, for the
assumption of international treaty obligations. Ratification processes,
in systems where they exist, are integral parts of consent and often
require popularly elected legislators to endorse the treaty instrument
signed by the executive. Ironically, even the Council is only able to
impose its decisions on a state by fiat with the prior consent of the
state to the Charter regime. 48 That includes consent to Articles 24
and 25. Under those provisions, UN Member States, in order to
ensure prompt and effective action, agree to accept and implement
Council decisions made in the exercise of the Council's primary
responsibility to ensure the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Interestingly, besides the objections entered into the record by
those states present and voting, many international lawyers have
been generally silent on the implications of the Council's
unprecedented action, both for the STL specifically and also for
international law more generally. Perhaps the matter has not
attracted their attention. Or, if it has, it could be that there has not
been much commentary because of the presence of consent from
Lebanon in this case. Also, the uniqueness of the situation may well
be perceived as necessarily precluding similar actions elsewhere. But
the real reason is probably because as, at least one legal commentator
has argued, with its adoption of a Chapter VII resolution, the Council
brought into effect not a bilateral treaty signed by the United Nations
and Lebanon-which power it did not possess-but rather effectively
transformed the STL into a binding measure. The resolution, of
course, incorporated the Tribunal's founding instruments and formed
an integral part thereof. Under this view, the STL cannot purport to
be a treaty-based institution, but is rather an "independent

Security Council and the Emancipation of InternationalCriminal Justice, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 485, 485-86 (2008) (stating that the unifying thread running through
Resolution 1757 abstentions was the belief that actors were encroaching on Lebanese
sovereignty).
Under the Charter of the United Nations, Member States undertake to
48.
accept and implement decisions of the Council taken under Chapter VII. See generally
U.N. Charter art. 7 (setting out various obligations of the Members of the United
Nations to actions taken by the Security Council).
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international tribunal under the authority of the United Nations." 49
This conclusion would appear to be correct as a matter of public
international law.

III. THE JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

A. The Tribunal'sPersonaland Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Article 1 of the STL Statute defines personal and temporal
jurisdiction and empowers the STL to prosecute "persons responsible"
for the February 14, 2005, bomb attack that killed then-Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and resulted in the deaths of at least
twenty-two others.50 With the use of the phrase "persons responsible,"
the United Nations returned to treaty language it initially used in the
equivalent personal jurisdiction provisions of the statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 5' It had, for the SCSL,
departed from that standard in favor of the more curtailed "greatest
responsibility" personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, the United Nations, partly because of its experience with
its two Chapter VII ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), has sought to
avoid overburdening subsequent courts by limiting the scope of
personal jurisdiction. This is consistent with the view that emerged in
the 1990s suggesting that international prosecutions should be a last
resort and that a failure to limit jurisdiction would lead to an opening
of the prosecutorial floodgates, with a correspondingly high financial
burden. In this vein, in the period between the creation of the ICTY
and ICTR in 1994 and the Sierra Leone Court in 2002, language
limiting personal jurisdiction
to those
"bearing greatest

49.
Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the InternationalLegality of the Special
Tribunalfor Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1091, 1100 (2007). Fassbender's argument
is correct, and in fact, proved to be consistent with the decisions that the STL later
issued in 2012 when faced with defense challenges to its jurisdiction and legality on,
inter alia, grounds including the alleged violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The
conclusion was that the Tribunal was solely created by Chapter VII resolution,
consistent with the Council's powers to maintain international peace and security.
50.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 1; see U.N. Secretary-General, Report,
supra note 29, J 11, 15, 24, Annex 2 (detailing the intent of the Security Council in
adopting Resolution 1664 and listing attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since October 1,
2004).
51.
Article 6 of the ICTY statute provides: "The International Tribunal shall
have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present
Statute." Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. For the equivalent section of the ICTR, see Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
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responsibility" or those "most responsible" was incorporated into the
SCSL and ECCC statutes, respectively. 52 Although the ICC is a
permanent court with its own distinctive multilateral treaty basis
instead of a creature forming part of the United Nations, similar
language has been placed in policy documents interpreting the scope
of its personal jurisdiction. This shows the tendency on the part of
some states to limit the reach of international criminal tribunals for
sovereignty and cost reasons. Where states have not imposed the
limitation, tribunal officials have nodded to their concerns, for
example, in the prosecutor's policies under the Rome Statute of the
ICC.53
In the statute of the Sierra Leone Court, the Council, against the
secretary-general's strong advice that it would make the tribunal's
reach too narrow, limited personal jurisdiction to the top echelon
"bearing greatest responsibility" for serious violations of international
humanitarian and national law committed in Sierra Leone. 54 This
language proved to be extremely controversial. The question that
arose, which was extensively litigated before the SCSL, was whether
the phrase "circumscribing jurisdiction to those bearing greatest
responsibility" established a jurisdictional hurdle that the
prosecution must clear before indicting a particular individual or
whether it merely served as a guideline for the prosecutor when she
is exercising her discretion.55 The defense argued the former while
the prosecution argued the latter. And in the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case, the Appeals Chamber agreed
with the prosecution, concluding that "greatest responsibility" serves
not as a distinct jurisdictional threshold but rather as a tool for
guiding prosecution strategy.5 6 The Chamber reasoned that this
would otherwise mean that a guilty person could evade punishment

52.
For an assessment of the practical problems arising from this type of
personal jurisdiction for such courts, see Charles Chernor Jalloh, Prosecuting Those
Bearing "GreatestResponsibility": The Lessons of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 96
MARQ. L. REV. 863, 863-911 (2013).
Though such language is arguably more apposite in that context given the
53.
complementary nature of the ICC's jurisdiction vis-A-vis States Parties. See Micaela
Frulli, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 EURO. J.
INT'L L. 857, 862-66 (2000) (discussing the influence of the Rome Statute on features of
the SCSL).
54.
See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), U.N. Doc
S/2002/246, app. II [hereinafter Sierra Leone Statute] ("The Special Court
the greatest
shall . . . have the power to prosecute persons who bear
responsibility. . . .").
See Jalloh, supra note 52, at 871 (arguing greatest responsibility was
55.
intended to "be both a jurisdictional requirement and a guideline for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion").
56.
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A,
Judgment,
282 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Feb. 22, 2008) (stating the only
workable interpretation of Article 1(1) is as a guide for prosecutors in exercising their
discretion).
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on the technical grounds that he was not among those bearing
greatest responsibility, as the indictment, which formed the basis of
the lengthy and costly trial that had already taken place, would be a
nullity. 57 It felt that the defendant's argument was a desperate
attempt to evade responsibility for the crimes for which he had been
convicted.5 8 The Appeals Chamber did not address the more difficult
defense submissions that such a determination ought to have been
made immediately after the accused was arrested. It considered but
missed the nuances in the finding of the other trial chamber of the
SCSL correctly holding that greatest responsibility was intended to
be both a jurisdictional requirement and a form of limitation on the
exercise of prosecutorial power. This, in the judicial view espoused in
the Civil Defense Forces' Trial, did not preclude the charging and
trial of both lower and higher ranking perpetrators. 59
The good news is that the United Nations appeared to put such
controversies to rest in the constitutive instruments of the new STL.
Indeed, the travaux preparatoires confirmed this reading when it
stated that "within the all-inclusive definition of the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal, the prosecutor will be free to pursue her
or his prosecutorial strategy and to determine the list of potential
indictees according to the evidence before him or her."60 Enormous
time and resources were spent litigating the greatest responsibility
problem at the SCSL. This ranged from preliminary motions filed
before the Trial Chamber in the pretrial phase to the appeals against
conviction in the first AFRC and the last Charles Taylor trials.6 '
Therefore, the United Nation's return to the ICTY and ICTR
jurisdiction formulae over "persons responsible," which itself was
based on identical language in the basic instruments of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, seems to be a much wiser decision.6 2
Turning to temporal jurisdiction, the STL initially was to cover
the February 14, 2005, attack. However, the secretary-general
expressed fear that such limited jurisdiction would put into "serious

57.
See id. 283 (refusing to strike out the indictment on the grounds that the
accused "has not been proved that the accused was not one of those who bore the
greatest responsibility").
58.
See id.
284 ("Kanu's interpretation of Article I of the Statute is a
desperate attempt to avoid responsibility for crimes for which he had been found
guilty."). Contra Jalloh, supra note 52.
59.
See Jalloh, supra note 52 (noting how Trial Chamber I found that lowranking perpetrators that committed exceptionally heinous crimes could have the
"greatest responsibility").
60.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29, 20 (emphasis added).
61.
See, e.g., Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A (stating "greatest responsibility"
serves as a guide for prosecutorial discretion).
62.
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 6, 14, Aug. 8, 1945,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter] (providing for the jurisdiction of the court
over "persons" who committed the crimes listed therein; however article 14 refers to the
persons investigated as "major" war criminals).
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doubt" the objectivity and impartiality of the tribunal. 63 Thus, to
avoid the "perception of selective justice,"64 flexibility was built into
the statute to enable prosecution of additional crimes connected to
the Hariri assassination if they occurred between October 1, 2004,
and December 13, 2005.65 The United Nations and Lebanon could
extend temporal jurisdiction to a later date, with the approval of the
Council, provided those attacks were, firstly, connected to the earlier
incident, and secondly, of a nature and gravity similar to the
February 14, 2005, attack. 66 Proof of the link that would justify
extension of temporal jurisdiction could be established in various
ways. 67 These would include examination of the motive or criminal
intent behind the attack, the manner in which the attack was
executed, any discernible patterns arising from it, and the kinds of
perpetrators and victims. 68 This understanding has since been
further fleshed out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, there was no
evidence of war crimes or genocide. But the secretary-general noted
the STL could have been empowered to prosecute crimes against
humanity since the acts committed in Lebanon appeared to meet the
basic definition of terrorism found in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals.6 9 Ultimately, the offense of terrorism as a crime

63.
concern for
64.
jurisdiction
65.

See U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29,
18 (expressing
singling out the assassination of Hariri).
Id.; see also Sader, supra note 1, at 1085 (referring to this extension of
as a "rejection of selective justice").
Article 1(1) of the Agreement states:

If the tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1
October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties
and with the consent of the Security Council, are connected in accordance with
the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the
attack of 14 February 2005, it shall also have jurisdiction over persons
responsible for such attacks. This connection includes but is not limited to a
combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive), the purpose
behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the
attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators.
Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 1(1). The STL RPE, in Rules 11 and 12, discuss the
practical steps that are required on the part of the prosecution to seek an extension of
the temporal jurisdiction. For more discussion of the issue of selective justice at the
STL, see Wierda, Nassar & Maalouf, supra note 1, at 1072-73.
66.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 1(1) (giving jurisdiction over certain
attacks that are connected to the December attack on Hariri).
67.
See id. (giving a nonexhaustive list for elements of an attack that might
lead to jurisdiction).
68.
Id.
69.
Specifically, the secretary-general stated that:
The attacks .. . could reveal a "pattern" or "methodical plan" of attacks
against a civilian population, albeit not in its entirety. They could be
"collective" in nature, or "a multiple commission of acts"4 and, as such, exclude
a single, isolated or random conduct of an individual acting alone. For the
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against humanity was not included in the STL's ratione materiae
jurisdiction because the secretary-general's proposal did not, for
unstated reasons, garner sufficient support within the Council. 70
Perhaps the members of that body were not convinced that the case
had been made out for the elements of the more heinous offense of
crimes against humanity. As a result, the crimes over which the STL
has subject matter competence are only "common crimes under the
Lebanese Criminal Code."71 That is, the court's jurisdiction is only
over the crimes of terrorism as defined under Lebanese (national, not
international) law.72 That said, in a significant ruling issued in
February 2011, the STL Appeals Chamber ruled that the Tribunal
must necessarily construe Lebanese law on terrorism in light of
existing international treaty and customary law.7 3
Structurally, besides the Defense Office, the organs of the STL
are the chambers, the prosecution; and the registry. These three
organs reflect the standard model found in all the other modern ad
hoc international courts. They are therefore unremarkable. The

crime of murder, as part of a systematic attack against a civilian population, to
qualify as a "crime against humanity", its massive scale is not an indispensable
element.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29, IT 23-24.
70.
See id. 1 25 (plainly noting that insufficient support from the interested
members of the Security Council resulted in the limitation of crimes to crimes under
the Lebanese Criminal Code).
71.
Id.; see also Jurdi, supra note 1, at 1127-28 (discussing how international
crimes should have been included in order to legitimize and strengthen the
international character and legitimacy of the STL); Schabas, supra note 3, at 519-21
(suggesting that the argument could go either way, numerous political and legal factors
could justify the acts being categorized or excluded from the purview of crimes against
humanity).
72.
See STL Statute, supranote 5, at art. 2 (stating that the Lebanese Criminal
Code is the criminal law applicable to the STL). The subject matter jurisdiction might
have significant implications for the legitimacy of the Tribunal. For instance, one
author argues compellingly that the exclusion of crimes against humanity reflects a
prudent legal analysis of the acts, but also renders the STL in wont of justification for
its inclusion of international modes of liability which are broader in certain instances
than those of Lebanon. See Marko Milanovic, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and
InternationalResponsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1139, 1142 (2007) (arguing the Statute of the STL would allow for conviction of
individuals who could not be convicted under Lebanese law).
73.
See Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on
the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, $ 45, 62 (Feb. 16, 2011), available at https://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?
option=com k2&Itemid=299&id=2688_af83958ae829e07003ae67eldebb374e&lang-fr&ta
sk=download&view-item [http://perma.cclJ525-GNWK] (archived Mar. 9, 2014) (stating
that Lebanese provisions may be construed in light of relevant international rules). For
commentary on the significance of the decision, see Michael P. Scharf, Special Tribunal
for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of
Participation, 15 ASIL INSIGHTS 6 (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/15/issue/6/special-tribunal-lebanon-issues-landmark-ruling-definitionterrorism-and#_ednref5 [http://perma.cc/5GMA-27GL] (archived Mar. 6, 2014).
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chambers, which consist of a pretrial judge, a trial chamber, and an
appeals chamber, have a minimum of eleven judges and could have
up to a maximum of fourteen. 74 Two international judges serve with a
Lebanese colleague in each trial chamber 75 while five judges sit in the
appeals chamber, two of whom must be Lebanese.76 At both the trial
and appellate levels, the international judges constitute a majority
much like in the Sierra Leone Tribunal, while the national judges
constitute a minority." This design is meant to insulate the court
from the local politics. Thus, if the national judges do not act
independently, for whatever reason, the international judges may
hopefully be trusted to step in and make nonpartisan decisions.
Appointed for a renewable three-year term by the secretarygeneral, the prosecutor is responsible for investigations and the
initiation of prosecutions.78 The Lebanese government, in
consultation with the secretary-general, appoints a Lebanese deputy
prosecutor.79 This replicates the structure that was first seen at the
SCSL.
Finally, the registrar is appointed by the secretary-general and
is a staff member of the United Nations 8 0-again, like his equivalent
in the SCSL. 8 1 As head of the administrative organ of the Tribunal,
his primary responsibility is to serve the parties and to develop
policies and manage the finances and personnel of the organization. 82
B. PracticalArrangements Resulted in Creation of the
Court in The Hague
With the legal framework in place by summer 2007, the
secretary-general and the Lebanese authorities began resolving the
practical arrangements necessary to make the STL a functional court
of law. All parties consented to a Headquarters Agreement situating

74.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2(3) (specifying how many judges there
will be and how they will be selected).
75.
Id. at art. 2(3)(b).
76.
Id. at art. 2(3)(d).
77.
See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 54, at art. 12 (requiring two out of
three judges to be international judges at trial level and three out of five judges to be
international judges at appellate level for the SCSL).
78.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 3(1)-(2) (laying out the three year
term).
79.
See id. at art. 3(3) (stating that the deputy prosecutor will assist in the
investigations and prosecutions).
80.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 12(1)-(3) (establishing the Registry,
consisting of the registrar and other needed staff, who are responsible for the
administration and servicing of the Tribunal).
81.
See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 54, at art. 16(1)-(3) (mandating
responsibilities and requirements of the registrar for the SCSL).
82.
See id. (making the Registry responsible for administration and servicing of
the Special Court).
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the Tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands.83 With the United Nations'
conclusion of a bilateral treaty with the Dutch authorities on behalf of
the Tribunal, the parties avoided the complications of Lebanese
participation that might have required implementation obligations
arising under Lebanese domestic law. This type of legal arrangement
seems to confirm the legal character of the Tribunal as a subsidiary
body created under Chapter VII of the Charter. The next significant
step was the appointment of the senior officials for the STL, starting
with the judges, the prosecutor, the registrar, and head of the
Defense Office.8 4
Crucially, some of the funding was secured and staffing needs
identified within about a year. The Management Committee, which
under its terms of reference will oversee the nonjudicial aspects of the
STL's operation (similar to its equivalent in the Sierra Leone
Tribunal), was constituted. The arrangements were made for a
transfer of investigative materials from the International
Independent Investigation Commission, which had preceded the
Tribunal; and security measures for the Tribunal and its witnesses
were worked out, as was a communication and outreach strategy that
would target Lebanon and the international community. Significant
amounts of evidence were gathered, and even before the STL officially
opened its first case, the work of the pretrial judge began and many of
the Prosecution, Chambers, and Registry staff were on board by
2010.85 But it took several years for prosecution lawyers to build a
case and to secure approvals of indictments against specific suspects.
In December 2013, the Tribunal issued a scheduling order for the
opening of its first trials in mid-January 2014.86 The trial has since

83.
Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United
Nations Concerning the Headquarters of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N.-Neth.,
art. 3, Dec. 21, 2007, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Trb.] 2007
Nr. 228 (Neth.) available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?option=comk2&
Itemid=286&id=152_f9631e0cec9d010477a20eb721f8ba03&ang=en&task=download&
view=item [http://perma.cc/P8T5-ESC8] (archived Mar. 6, 2014).
The Chambers is comprised of eleven judges with Judge Sir David
84.
Braganawath as president. The second registrar, Mr. Herman von Hebel, was appointed
March 1, 2010, to replace the late Robin Vincent, the former registrar of the SCSL. von
Hebel has since been replaced by Darryl Mundis who took over after he moved on to the
ICC as Registrar. Daniel A. Bellemare, was appointed Prosecutor November 14, 2007.
The post of prosecutor is now occupied by Norman Farrell, a Canadian lawyer, whose
experience includes domestic prosecutions experience as well as service in the Rwanda
and Yugoslav Tribunals. His Lebanese deputy prosecutor is Madame Joyce F. Tabet. The
head of the Defense Office is Francois Roux, appointed March 9, 2009. See About the STL
- Biographies, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-thestl/biographies [http://perma.cc/FF2U-WS3E] (archived Feb. 26, 2014) (providing
biographical information of current and former office holders).
See Case No. CH/PTJ/2010/003, Scheduling Order for a Hearing (Special
85.
Trib. for Leb. June 25, 2010) (addressing an application by Sayed for evidence that he
was arbitrarily detained for over three years).
See Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-Ol/PT/TC,
86.
Scheduling Order (Special Trib. for Leb. Dec. 10, 2013) (scheduling the opening of the
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opened, albeit in absentia, with the prosecution laying out its case
against the four defendants who are all at large (although they are
represented by duty counsel).
IV. EVOLVING DEFENSE RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

A. The Problem:Defense Was Forgottenfrom the
Watershed of InternationalCriminal Law
in 1945
Since the first major international cooperative effort to prosecute
international crimes was carried out by the United States and its
allies after World War II, international criminal law has
acknowledged the importance of granting at least a modicum of fair
trial rights for accused persons. As chief American prosecutor,
Associate Justice Robert Jackson noted before opening the
Nuremberg Trials that the procedural guarantees of fair trials aimed
to ensure that punishment is meted out only to the "right men and for
the right reasons."8 7 To do otherwise, in his view, would have
tarnished the legitimacy of the trials and not sit easily on the
American conscience. Moreover, since then, fair trials have become
sacrosanct as a function of the rise of due process concerns in modern
international human rights law. This has led to the adoption of
important treaty instruments guaranteeing fundamental fair trial
rights that are nonderogable. 88
But despite strong statutory language obligating fair trials for
defendants, a contrary practice has developed, starting with the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. These courts failed to include
within their founding instruments institutional frameworks designed
to ensure the fair trial of the accused. This trend of not matching the
principled statutory commitment to the right to a fair trial with an
joint trials of four defendants on January 16, 2014). A second case, involving Hassan
Habib Merhi, is also scheduled to start as a trial in absentia. See Prosecutor v. Hassan
Habib Merhi, Case No. STL-13-04/I/TC, Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia (Special
Trib. for Leb. Dec. 10, 2013) (explaining the Special Tribunal's decision to try Merhi in
absentia).
87.
ROBERT JACKSON, DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. 3080, REPORT OF ROBERT H.
JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

MILITARY TRIALS,

LONDON

1945,

§

III,

2

(June 6,

1945),

available at

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NFE8-DTGV] (archived Mar. 9, 2014).
88.
See Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29, States of Emergency, art.
4, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11,
11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (regarding non-derogable
rights: "State parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as
justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of
international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments,
through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of
fair trial,including the presumption of innocence.") (emphasis added).
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office responsible for ensuring that those rights are upheld has
regrettably continued with contemporary international criminal
courts.8 9 In other words, there is a difference between paying lip
service to the rights of suspects and accused persons and putting in
place the structures that will ensure the realization of those rights.
The courts accomplished the former but failed to deliver on the latter.
As Elise Groulx, president of the International Criminal Defense
Lawyers Association aptly notes, "[t]he institutional basis for a truly
independent body of defense lawyers is very much lacking in the
Statutes of these courts, even though the rights of the accused are
clearly articulated on paper."90 In contrast, those same instruments
spell out in great detail the institutional role of the other organs of
the tribunals-namely, the Prosecution, Chambers, and the
Registry.9 1
This institutional failure-the delayed realization of the "third
pillar" 92 of international criminal law-reflects concerns for
sovereignty and the reality that states traditionally have primary
jurisdiction to enforce criminal law within their territories and over
their nationals.9 3 In an environment in which international
prosecution efforts must be justified, legalized, and legitimated for
state consent to be given, concerns for defense rights have largely
been overshadowed by prosecution concerns.9 4 This is particularly
true given that the defense routinely challenges, both within and
outside of these trials, the legality and the legitimacy, of the tribunals
purporting to assert jurisdiction over the defendants.9 5

89.
Including the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and most strikingly the permanent ICC,
which did not follow through with proposals to include a separate organ for defense.
See Elise Groulx, "Equality of Arms": Challenges Confronting the Legal Profession in
the EmergingInternationalCriminalJustice System, 3 OXFORD U. COMP. L.F. n.35 and
surrounding text (2006), available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/groulx.shtml
[http://perma.cc/4ZC4-RTJM] (archived Feb. 23, 2014) (noting that the Rome Statute is
completely silent regarding institutional support for defense lawyers).
90.
Id. n.6 and accompanying text.
91.
See id. (stressing the inequality of arms that is created); see, e.g., Rome
Statute, supra note 22, at art. 15 (detailing the duties and powers of the prosecutor).
92.
M. Cherif Bassiouni refers to the three main pillars of international
criminal law: the "independent judiciary, a prosecuting authority which guards public
interests, and independent and effective defense counsel." Groulx, supra note 89, at n. 16
and accompanying text.
93.

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 292-94 (7th

ed. 2008) (describing the "reserved" domestic jurisdiction of states).
94.
Groulx describes how the international push to end impunity led "to a focus
on the prosecution of alleged perpetrators and compensation of victims. The system
was built very rapidly without including the legal profession in an organized and
continuous manner, in the design of the system - or looking critically at the methods of
protecting the rights of individuals accused of committing heinous crimes." Groulx,
supra note 89, at n.13 and accompanying text.
95.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former
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The problem is that this pattern was not only a historical one. In
the modern setting, UN-supported international tribunals have
adopted elaborate provisions guaranteeing fair trials for the accused.
This in one way reflects the advances in, and impact of, modern
international human rights law on international criminal law. 96
Thus, Articles 20 and 21 of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR,
respectively guarantee fundamental fair trial rights for the accused,
as do Articles 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute.9 7 Those provisions,
inspired by, but reaching beyond, Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 8 are often
supplemented by the procedural rules applicable before the tribunals,
which, taken individually or together, offer much more to the accused
than did the basic Articles 16 and 9 of the Charters of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, respectively. 9 Indeed, the justice meted out
following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which did not give the
right of appeal and permitted use of the death penalty under Articles
27 and 16, respectively, may offend modern human rights
sensibilities. 0 0 This sensibility has elevated due process rights even
higher. So, for instance, the right to appeal, which was originally
denied by the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals, has by now arguably
achieved the status of a jus cogens, a kind of super international law
rule, from which no state is allowed to derogate.' 0

Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (deciding that the ICTY since 1991 had jurisdiction over
national courts).
96.
See Groulx, supra note 89, at text immediately following n.36
("Independence of the legal profession was explicitly recognized (Rule 20(2)) and linked
directly to the right to a fair trial.").
97.
Article 66 preserves the presumption of innocence, while Article 67 speaks
to the rights and entitlements of the accused. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at arts.
66-67.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9(3), 14, Mar. 23,
98.
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also WILLIAM A. ScHABAS, UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOsLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 503 (2006);
Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of the International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting
Respect for FairTrial Rights, 8 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2009) (noting that the fair
trial guarantees of Article 14 mirror Article 21 of the ICTY statute and Article 20 of the
ICTR statute).
99.
IMT Charter, supra note 62, at art. 16; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 9, Annexed to the Special Proclamation of
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Establishing an International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Case No. 001/18-07-2008/ECCC/OCIJ (1946) [hereinafter
IMTFE Charter].
100.
The three leaders of the victorious allies apparently flirted with the idea of
having executions of former Nazi leaders instead of war crimes trials. See ARIEH J.
KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF
PUNISHMENT 220-21 (1998) (discussing Stalin's suggestion to incinerate approximately
25,000 German officers); see also STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 26 (providing for
appellate proceedings for the STL).
101.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 55, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (setting out, in Article 55, that a treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law; that is, a
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Lacking the administrative infrastructure to practically ensure
the rights pledged to the accused persons, contemporary international
criminal courts have assigned the Registry-the administrative organ
of the tribunals that is supposed to neutrally service the Prosecution,
Defense, and Chambers-to provide legal aid assistance for indigent
accused.10 2 A key component of legal aid is the provision of qualified
and competent counsel to represent suspects and accused persons
before the tribunals. Thus, in the ICTY there is an Office of Legal Aid
and Detention Matters; in the ICTR, a Defense Counsel and
Detention Management Section; and in the ICC, an Office of Public
Counsel for the Defense. These offices have come to play, under
generally difficult conditions, a vital role in the justice process. They
ensure that the defendants, and in some cases suspects, before those
courts are represented by competent counsel in the interest of
justice.1 03

B. The Sierra Leone Tribunal's Solution: Include the Defense,
Even if Only as a Second Class Citizen
The SCSL followed in the footsteps of the ICTY and the ICTR. It
was therefore the third of the modern ad hocs. In that court, which
had experience in defense matters that was crucially brought to bear
in the creation of the new STL, Article 17 of the Statute enshrined
the fair trial rights of the accused.1 04 Similar to other international
criminal tribunals, Article 17 and the rest of their founding
instruments did not specify how fair trial guarantees will practically
be realized by the accused or which of the three formally recognized
statutory organs (i.e. the Chambers, Prosecution, or Registry) will be
responsible for ensuring them.105 In fact, the mention of the defense
is very limited in the founding documents of the Tribunal.

norm accepted by the entire international community from which no derogation is
permitted and can only be modified by a subsequent general international law norm
having the same character).
102.
See, e.g., infra notes 126-29 (discussing the role of the Registry at the
Sierra Leone Court).
103.
See Rupert Skilbeck, Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 66, 71-77 (2004) (describing
roles of defense offices in the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC).
104.
The rights articulated in Article 17 of the Sierra Leone Statute, Article 21
of the ICTY, Article 20 of the ICTR, and Articles 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute are
supplemented by those rights that the accused enjoy under general conventional and
customary international law, in particular, Article 14 of the ICCPR. See, e.g., Charles
Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the Sword?, 117 PENN ST. L.
REV. 707 (2013) (discussing the right of self-representation in international criminal
tribunals and the challenges of giving effect to it without sacrificing principle).
105.
Article 17 of the Sierra Leone Statute guarantees a fair and public hearing,
a presumption of innocence, minimum guarantees, etc. It refers to each of the rights
using some variation of the phrase "The accused shall" without specifying duties of any
organs of the Court to protect these rights. See Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No.
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For instance, Article 14 of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement
accords to counsel of suspects and accused immunity from personal
arrest and from criminal and civil process, and protects the
inviolability of all documents relating to the exercise of their
functions as counsel. 106 However, the rest of the treaty does not
provide for the collective structural arm of defense within the
Tribunal as compared to the organs for the Prosecution, Chambers, or
Registry. It does not even claim to create a lesser organ to uphold
rights of the accused or provide modalities for the hiring of the
defense lawyers who play an indispensable role in ensuring the
fairness of trials before the SCSL. 107 It seems as if the defense was
simply forgotten. This omission from the statute should appear
significant in that it implies that it is possible to have a fair trial
without creating an explicit mechanism for protecting defendant
rights. Or, at least, assumes that other offices within the existing
organs, notably the Registry, could fulfill that role.
Similarly, in the so-called residual mechanisms created to
continue the work of these ad hoc courts, almost no reference is made
to the defense.1 08 While perhaps the omission of the defense might

SCSL-2004-16-AR73, Decision on Brima-Kamara Defense Appeal Motion Against
Trial Chamber II Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent Confidential Joint Motion for
the Re-Appointment of Kevin Metzger and Wilbert Harris as Lead Counsel for Alex
Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara,
82, 84 (Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Dec. 8, 2005) (inferring that according to the Statute, no organ carries the
responsibility for ensuring the rights of the Accused, but rather it must be "a common
duty shared by the three organs"); see also Skilbeck, supra note 103, at 79 (describing
the creation of the Defense Office through the rules of procedure even though the office
was ignored in the SCSL's Statute).
106.
Article 14, relating to Counsel, provides:
1.
The Government shall ensure that the counsel of a suspect or an
accused who has been admitted as such by the Special Court shall not be
subjected to any measure which may affect the free and independent exercise of
his or her functions. 2. In particular, the counsel shall be accorded: (1)
Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of personal
baggage; (b) Inviolability of all documents relating to the exercise of his or her
functions as a counsel of a suspect or accused; (c) Immunity from criminal or
civil jurisdiction in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed in
his or her capacity as counsel. Such immunity shall continue to be accorded
after termination of his or her functions as counsel of a suspect or accused. (d)
Immunity from any immigration restrictions during his or her stay as well as
during his or her journey to the Court and back.
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 14, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
138 [hereinafter UN-Sierra Leone Agreement].
107.
See supra note 84. Similarly, little reference has been made to the defense
in the closing legal instrument of the tribunal.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of
108.
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and
Statute of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, Feb. 1, 2012, [hereinafter Sierra
Leone Residual Special Court Agreement] available at http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/RSCSL%20Agreement%20and%20Statute.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9CT6-ZUEV]
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have initially been understandable, in light of the paucity of
international experience with such trials at the time the ICTY and
the ICTR were created in 1993 and 1994, it is puzzling that the
defense was also left out in the statutes of the residual courts. One
might have thought that the lesson of the various ad hoc courts that
the UN secretary-general had midwifed into existence would
henceforth include such a framework in the next set of institutions
charged with finishing their mandates. Interestingly, in the Report
on the Establishment of the Lebanon Tribunal, he had rightly noted
that creation of a defense office as an organ is now integral to the
institutional fabric of these courts. 109 It is hard to explain the
omission, especially in the face of the position that had been taken on
some of those courts. This might lead to the cynical conclusion that
these mechanisms are still biased toward efforts at justifying and
legitimating prosecutions. Conversely, that the apparent concern
about defense rights continue to be lip service at best and after
thoughts at best.
In any case, returning to the SCSL, the judges of the Sierra
Leone Court sought to address the lacuna regarding the defense in
the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the Statute of the SCSL by
adopting Rule 45 of the RPE.1"0 While that is not the same as having
the defense included in the primary documents, as was the case at
the STL, it was, to their credit, better than doing nothing. Thus, in
Rule 45(A), they directed the registrar of the SCSL to "develop,
establish and maintain" a Defense Office (otherwise known as the
OPD) with the view "to ensuring the rights of suspects and accused
persons."111 The OPD, headed by a principal defender, was to fulfill
its functions primarily by offering duty counsel situated reasonably
close to the detention facility to provide initial legal advice and
assistance for accused; legal assistance for indigent accused as may
be ordered by the judges in the interests of justice; and adequate
support and facilities for counsel to defend the accused. 112 The broad
nature of Rule 45 necessarily meant that it later had to be
supplemented by various other provisions and policies developed by
the OPD and the Registry; for example, the Directive on the
1 13
Assignment of Counsel and the Indigence Guidelines.

(archived Feb. 23, 2014) (providing for the establishment of a Chambers, prosecutor,
and registrar in Article 2 and envisaging a roster of judges, prosecutors, and registrars
in Articles 11, 14, and 15, but strikingly omitting the inclusion of a Defense Office).
109.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29, 30.
110.
See ALISON THOMPSON & MICHELLE STAGGS, THE DEFENCE OFFICE AT THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 18-20 (2007) (describing
the delayed establishment of the Defense Office at the Sierra Leone Court).
111.
SPEC. CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. P. & EVID. 45(A) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE
COURT RPE].
112.
Id. at r. 45(B).
113.
See Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Contribution of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone to the Development of InternationalLaw, 15 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165,
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The Sierra Leone Court's creation of an OPD with a mandate to
ensure the rights of suspects and accused persons has been widely
acknowledged in the international criminal justice community. The
late Italian jurist, Antonio Cassese, described it as "a groundbreaking innovation," 114 and William Schabas, a leading authority,
spoke of it as one of the "more significant innovations in this area."1 15
Respected human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
such as the International Center for Transitional Justice and Human
Rights Watch, have also lauded the Sierra Leone Court for the new
course it charted in this area. 116 Even the OPD's fiercest critics could
not begrudge it the conclusion that, in many respects, it "represents a
tremendous achievement."1 17
Given the relative youth of
international criminal courts, the establishment of a semiautonomous public defender's office within the Registry-one that
contracts private defense counsel to represent the accused while
working with its own in-house lawyers (duty counsel) to provide
backup support for counsel-advanced an unprecedented approach to
ensuring greater equality of arms between the prosecution and
defense in international criminal justice administration.
But the conceptual promise of the OPD was thwarted in practice
by various factors. For one thing, disputes between the office and
defense counsel, with whom it largely had a frosty relationship,
undermined the authority of the office. There are, of course, several
reasons that have been offered for the various troubles faced by the
office, including an unclear mandate, poor staffing, and alleged
disinterest in its success on the part of its parent body: the
Registry.1 18 Yet ultimately, foremost among even these issues, was a
fundamental structural problem: its lack of operational independence

180 (2007) (citing to the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel and Indigence
Guidelines).
114.
(2006).

115.

ANTONIO CASSESE, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

10

SCHABAS, supra note 98, at 615.

116.
See THIERRY CRUVELLIER & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, CASE STUDY SERIES: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST

EIGHTEEN MONTHS 3 (2004) (discussing the new innovated defense structure in the
SCSL); Human Rights Watch, Bringing Justice: The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Accomplishments, Shortcomings, and Needed Support, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Sept. 27,
2004, at 22, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/09/07/bringing-justicespecial-court-sierra-leone [http://perma.ccIW7HS-3NFL] (archived Mar. 9, 2014) ("We
believe that the Defense Office represents a deepening of practical experience drawn
from the work of the ad hoc tribunals.").
117.
THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 4.
118.
See Sareta Ashraph, The Naked Defense Office: How an Unclear Mandate,
Poor Staffing, and Registry DisinterestStripped the Office of the PrincipalDefender, in
THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 550, 555-70 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed., 2013)
(discussing the unclear role of the Defense Office and the conflicting views between the
registrar and the Defense Office).

20141

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

793

from the registrar.1 19 The office's dependence on that organ proved
unhealthy in various important respects. For one thing, its
subjugation to the registrar's oversight gave a measure of control to
that body in interpreting and narrowing down its mandate, especially
given the ambiguous language of Rule 45.
Similarly, the registrar had ultimate oversight over its staff and
could determine the personnel needs of the office, in both a direct
sense in terms of assessing staff performance and the numbers and
professional classification of those working in the sub-unit.
Furthermore, the office relied on the budgetary largesse of the same
organ which in turn affected its discharge of an independent legal aid
and logistical support functions for the defense counsel, especially in
instances where a different view was held vis-A-vis that of the
Registry legal advisers. Thus, even at its stillborn birth, the SCSL's
Defense Office lacked the necessary administrative independence
from the Registry to act only in the interests of the accused and
justice. Why?
The registrar, as chief purser of a shoe-strong budget, was
typically tied to so-called "zero-growth" budgets imposed by the states
that constituted the court's Management Committee. 120 Yet in the
world of legal aid and complex international criminal cases,
substantial funds, often unbudgeted, must be disbursed to hire
competent defense counsel or to otherwise meet the investigative and
other unanticipated needs of defense teams.121 In this general
environment of austerity, where absorbing unplanned expenditures
was seen to hardly be an option, this essentially put the registrar in a
conflict of interest vis-A-vis his duty to ensure the practical
realization of the rights of the accused and his desire to ensure that
only minimal resources were expended by the tribunal.
To his credit, (the now late) Robin Vincent, the first registrar of
the Sierra Leone Court (who incidentally was appointed to the same
position in the STL), appreciated this dilemma and apparently
supported Simone Monasebian, the first principal defender, in her
efforts to seek a revised statute-based mandate for the OPD to build
some distance and become a more effective institutional
counterweight to the Prosecution.122 Despite the best efforts of the
first principal defender, proposals to remove the OPD from the

119.
See Jalloh, supra note 113, at 180 (noting that rule 45(A) gave the registrar
the responsibility of establishing, developing, and maintaining the Defense Office).
120.
See id. at 181 (stating that the limited funding imposed limitations on the
model ultimately chosen for the defense).
121.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 23-24 (referencing the
limitations imposed as a result of the shoestring budget).
122.
Vincent 0. Nmehielle, Position Paper on the Independence of the Office of
the Principal Defender at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2 [hereinafter OPD
Position Paper] (on file with the author) (submitted to the Management Committee of
the SCSL by Vincent 0. Nmehielle, Principal Defender).
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manacles of the Registry by making it a full-fledged organ did not
appear to garner the requisite support within the Management
Committee of the court and from the UN Office of Legal Affairs.1 23
Ultimately, it seems that the OPD's proposals for amendments to the
Sierra Leone Court's constitutive documents were found to have been
insufficiently motivated. The proposals were not forwarded to the
secretary-general or the Council for their consideration and
decision. 124 It was also unclear whether the proposed amendments
secured the support of the Sierra Leonean authorities, whose position
as bilateral founding partner in the work of the tribunal appears to
slowly erode over time.125 After the second principal defender,
Vincent Nmehielle, assumed duty in mid-2005, he continued the
struggle for the OPD's autonomy. As part of this, he resuscitated the
proposal to amend the relevant founding instruments of the Sierra
Leone Court.126 Independence was felt to be necessary for three main
reasons.
Firstly, autonomy for the OPD would translate into immediate
practical benefits for the accused in the SCSL. It was hoped that the
administrative decisions relating to defense teams would be based
less on budgetary constraints and more on assessments of the merits
of the issues before the office.1 27 And that if there was a difference of
view with the registrar, the principal defender's position would trump
on interests of justice concerns since he had direct operational
experience with the defense matters and was expected to play a
supportive role by the accused persons.
Secondly, autonomy would translate into immediate budgetary
independence for the Defense Office vis-A-vis the Registry-similar to
the position enjoyed by the Office of the Prosecutor.128 This does not
mean that the office would not be subject to any oversight. Rather,
what it would have meant is that it would be up to the principal
defender to identify the budgetary needs and to make the case for

123.
See id. at 13 (stating as part of the Plan of Action, that the present plan
needs to be sent and approved by the UN Office of Legal Affairs).
124.
Id. at 1.
125.
See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 9,
2000 from the Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000) (requesting
assistance from the Security Council in establishing a court in Sierra Leone).
126.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 32 (discussing Nmehielle's
argument to the tribunal that the Defense Office was a fourth pillar of the tribunal).
127.
See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (noting how Defense was left, on the eve of beginning
two cases, with a seventy four percent smaller budget for the much needed "contractual
services" of individual defense teams' work, including the staffing costs for counsel,
investigators, and experts).
128.
Rather than spending time lobbying the court to pressure the registrar,
such independence would allow the Defense Office to focus more on the issues at hand.
See id. at 25, 44 (noting that being tied to the Registry for funding results in budgetary
insecurities).
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them rather than having his yearly forecasts be gutted by the
registrar as a first check before they are even formally submitted for
consideration by the court's Management Committee comprised of
more independent third states. While those countries, chaired by
Canada, did exercise oversight, they had more distance from the
issues and could perhaps support such proposals if they are deemed
sufficiently justified in light of operational needs.
Last but not least, in the embattled and divisive environment of
the Sierra Leone Court wherein the OPD was at once touted as the
fourth pillar of the court but at the same time struggled daily to fulfill
its basic mandate, it was felt that a measure of administrative
distance from the registrar would help establish an important
precedent for the defense in future international criminal tribunals.
In other words, the final imperative was a deeply ideological one,
under which it was felt that autonomy would give primacy to the fair
trial rights of accused persons by creating an organ responsible for
ensuring them. The office saw itself as a trail blazer whose example
could be followed in other courts that the international community
might establish in the future. 129 It is interesting that the later
experience, with the STL's creation of a defense arm, bore this out to
some extent.
As part of the OPD strategy to achieve autonomy from the
registrar, the office attempted to secure broader support that would
be reflected in the statute. It thus turned to the president of the
Sierra Leone Court, the majority of the judges sitting in plenary (who
had initially created it under the RPE) and the court's Management
Committee (which ultimately controlled the purse strings) for a
package of changes to the constitutive instruments of the court.130
These changes were essentially the same as those the first principal
defender had proposed. However, because of internal tribunal politics,
Nmehielle's resuscitated proposals were also opposed by two
successive registrars of the Sierra Leone Court. Perhaps the registrar
perceived the OPD's call for liberation as a threat to or an erosion of
powers.' 3 1 For the judges, there might have been concern that the
office's own vision of itself proved to be contradictory with the way the
judges saw it as being required to act, especially since there were
independent defense lawyers providing the representational needs for
the accused persons. Interestingly, although this might appear to
contradict a traditional perception that the Prosecution should act as
a minister of justice, the proposal was also opposed by prosecutors

129.
See id. at 28 (noting the principal defender's key argument for reform: it is
not so much about equality between prosecution and defense, but rather the principle
that defense should control its own budget).
130.
OPD Position Paper,supra note 122.
131.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 32 (noting the registrar's
insistence that the defense be within its purview).
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who took exception to having a stronger OPD mandate in the
constitutive statute of the tribunal in a strange alliance with one
dissenting but rather vocal defense team. 132 In the end, the second
attempt also failed at the plenary and Management Committee
stages, wherein various officials paid lip service to the importance of
fair trial rights but failed to engage the substantive concerns
underpinning the idea or to offer viable alternatives to the
restructuring of the Defense Office.13 3
Today, as the SCSL has completed its last trial of formerLiberian President Charles Taylor in September 2013 and shut down
its doors and transformed into a residual mechanism in December
2014, the chances of creating a fourth defense pillar at the SCSL have
virtually disappeared. Interestingly, in the Agreement of the Residual
SCSL, which was envisaged to take over after completion of the
judicial activities of the court, the Defense was also not
represented.134 And even before the closure, the Registry-evidently
compelled by the completion strategy-has downsized the relatively
small staff of the OPD, reducing it to a mere shadow of its former
self.'3 5
B. The Significance of the Lebanon Tribunal's Creation
of an Independent Defense Office Organ
Against the above backdrop, the significance of the Defense
Office in the STL as the first full-fledged independent organ in an
internationalized criminal court cannot be overemphasized. Indeed,
as has been observed elsewhere, this marks a first in the history of
international criminal law.1 36 The OPD of the Sierra Leone Court has
undoubtedly influenced this development, likely an enduring part of
its wider legacy, through its unsuccessful efforts for statutory and
operational autonomy from the registrar. As will be argued more fully
below, if the level of commitment signaled in the STL Statute is
matched by a similar level of funding and operational distance for the
defense, it will likely be celebrated by practitioners and academics

132.
See id. at 33 (noting that the Prosecution opposed any use of the phrase
"fourth pillar" to describe the defense).
133.
Personal observation of the author (who worked as the last Legal Adviser to
the Office of the Principal Defender).
134.
See Sierra Leone Residual Special Court Agreement, supra note 108, at art.
2 (providing for Prosecution, Chambers, and Registry, but no Defense organ).
135.
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 116, at 24 (urging the registrar and
the Management Committee to improve funding to the defense at the Sierra Leone
Court).
136.
Jalloh, supra note 104, at 182; see also Vincent 0. Nmehielle, The Defense
Office at the Special Court, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE
IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 527, 535 (Charles Chernor
Jalloh ed., 2013).
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alike as a strong contribution to the maturation of international
criminal justice institutions.

V. THE DEFENSE IN THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

A. Remembering the Defense for the First Time in
InternationalCriminalLaw: Better Late
Than Never
The founding instruments of the STL address the role of the
defense in various provisions. Article 2(1) of the UN-Lebanon
Agreement mirrors Article 7 of the STL Statute and provides for the
Tribunal to have four organs: "the Chambers, the Prosecutor, the
Registry and the Defense Office."13 7 [Emphasis added].
Pursuant to Article 11 of the UN-Lebanon Agreement, the head
of the Defense Office enjoys, during his time in Lebanon, the same
privileges, immunities, exemptions, and facilities accorded to the
prosecutor and his deputy, the registrar, and the judges. 138 As with
other international criminal courts, the privileges and immunities
conferred on the principals of the STL are the same as those accorded
to diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.' 3 9 Those privileges accrue to the benefit of the
organization, which can waive them as appropriate, not to the
personal benefit of the individuals working in the organization.140
Importantly, through Article 13 the Lebanese government
guarantees that defense counsel, who usually practice before such
tribunals as private contractors instead of staff members, will also
enjoy various kinds of immunities during their time in Lebanon.141
These functional immunities provide defense counsel what must by
now be standard protections from personal arrest, detention, or
seizure of their personal effects; inviolability of documents relating to

137.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2(1); Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7
(stating that "The Special Tribunal shall possess the juridical capacity necessary: (a)
To contract; (b) To acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; (c) To
institute legal proceedings; (d) To enter into agreements with States as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and for the operation of the Tribunal.").
138.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 11(1) ("The judges, the Prosecutor, the
Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Head of the Defence Office, while in
Lebanon, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded
to diplomatic agents in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961.").
139.
Id. at art. 11(1); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
140.
See Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 11(2) ("Privileges and immunities are
accorded to the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the
Head of the Defence Office in the interest of the Special Tribunal and not for the
personal benefit of the individuals themselves.").
141.
Id. at art. 13.
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the exercise of their role as lawyers for the suspects or accused before
the Tribunal; immunity from criminal or civil process for oral or
written statements made in the course of discharging their dutieswhich immunity survives the end of their function; and protection
from immigration restrictions during their stay in the country or
journey to and from Tribunal business. 142 The importance of this
provision cannot be emphasized enough. To take but one example, in
the ICC Libya Situation, Melinda Taylor, interim court-appointed
duty counsel for Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, was subject not only to search
and seizure of her documents but also to unlawful arrest and
detention by Libyan authorities.143 There have been similar arrests
and harassment of defense lawyers in other tribunals in, for instance,
Rwanda.
Finally, Article 15(1) of the Agreement establishes that Lebanese
authorities shall cooperate with all organs of the STL, especially the
Prosecution and defense counsel, throughout the proceedings.1 44 This
includes facilitating access for all counsel to sites, persons, and
relevant documents required in the investigation.145 Article 15(2)
creates a further obligation to comply with any request for assistance
by the Tribunal, including its organs, the prosecutor, and the head of
the defense, or an order for assistance made by the Chamber.146
Drawing upon the experience of the ad hoc courts, this provision is
another important step forward in the march toward equality
between the prosecution and defense in the international criminal
tribunals. As national authorities are commonly known to afford a
higher level of cooperation to prosecution than to defense lawyers,
this positive obligation will help provide practical assurance that the
142.

Article 13 provides that:

[T]he counsel shall be accorded: (a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of personal baggage; (b) Inviolability of all documents relating
to the exercise of his or her functions as a counsel of a suspect or accused; (c)
Immunity from criminal or civil jurisdiction in respect of words spoken or
written and acts performed in his or her capacity as counsel. Such immunity
shall continue to be accorded after termination of his or her functions as a
counsel of a suspect or accused; (d) Immunity from any immigration
restrictions during his or her stay as well as during his or her journey to the
Tribunal and back.

Id.
143.
ICC Staff Members.
144.
Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 15(1).
145.
See id. ("The Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special
Tribunal, in particular with the Prosecutor and defence counsel, at all stages of the
proceedings. It shall facilitate access of the Prosecutor and defence counsel to sites,
persons and relevant documents required for the investigation.").
146.
See id. at art. 15(2) ("The Government shall comply without undue delay
with any request for assistance by the Special Tribunal or an order issued by the
Chambers, including, but not limited to: (a) Identification and location of persons; (b)
Service of documents; (c) Arrest or detention of persons; (d) Transfer of an indictee to
the Tribunal.").
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defense will not face obstacles that could be put in place by Lebanese
authorities to hinder the defense of potentially domestically
unpopular or controversial defendants.14 7 Indeed, likely because of
the independence of the Defense Office, it has negotiated a
memorandum of understanding with Lebanon's Ministry of Justice to
enable full cooperation and access into the country for defense counsel
investigations and other matters related to the exercise of their
functions in representing suspects (or the accused).1 48 This is a
welcome development and, to this writer's knowledge, is a first in the
history of international criminal tribunals. It plainly enables the
Defense Office to create a special legal regime to benefit the defense
counsel in relation to several areas of state cooperation. The office
thus brings institutional weight to bear for the defendants and their
counsel, to permit access to the country and investigations, in a
manner similar to the way the prosecutor could take such
arrangements for granted at the SCSL and other ad hoc courts.
In addition to the above provisions in the UN-Lebanon
Agreement, Articles 15 and 16 of the STL Statute enshrine
fundamental rights for "suspects" and the "accused." 149 These rights
are familiar to American lawyers and probably the public. Article 15
explains that a suspect, i.e., a person being questioned during
Prosecution investigations before the laying of formal charges in an
indictment, has the right be informed before that questioning that
there are grounds to believe that she is a suspect in a criminal
investigation;' 5 0 the right to be questioned in the presence of counsel
unless she has voluntarily waived that right;15 1 the right to not be

147.
This is a comment on the equality of the cooperation mechanisms available,
not on the sufficiency of mechanisms generally available. For critical analysis of the
STL cooperation mechanisms, see Lukasz Korecki, Procedural Tools for Ensuring
Cooperation of States with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 927
(2009); Swart, supra note 1.
148.
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the
Lebanese Republic and the Defence Office on the Modalities of Their Cooperation, July
28, 2010, available at http://www.stltsl.org/index.php?option=com-k2&Itemid=
286&id=143_727112d5627cab330afb0297dfdfe2df&ang-en&task=download&view=ite
m [http://perma.ce/ FTT8-L2NF] (archived Feb. 21, 2014).
149.
The Statute does not define the terms suspect or accused. A person is a
suspect until he or she is formally indicted, while an accused is a person that has been
formally indicted by the prosecutor.
150.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 15(a) ("A suspect who is to be
questioned by the Prosecutor . .. shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to
questioning, in a language he or she speaks and understands: (a) The right to be
informed that there are grounds to believe that he or she has committed a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal . . . .").
151.
See id. at art. 15(e) ("A suspect who is to be questioned by the
Prosecutor . .. shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to questioning, in a language
he or she speaks and understands: . . . (e) The right to be questioned in the presence of
counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.").
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compelled to incriminate herself or confess guilt; 152 the right to
remain silent, without any adverse inferences being drawn as to her
guilt or innocence;15 3 and the right to legal assistance of her own
choosing when the interests of justice so require 154
This paragraph introduces the right to counsel, laying out the
basic distinctions between Article 16 of the Statute governing
suspects and the clauses protecting the rights of the accused in other
tribunals, which will be discussed in further detail below. The right to
legal assistance of a suspect's choosing presumably means, consistent
with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the right to
be assigned a qualified lawyer from either the Defense Office or the
list of counsel maintained by it. It does not include a right to a
particularlawyer.1 55 Perhaps because of the generally serious gravity
of international crimes, the tribunals have been relatively more
generous in according certain rights to suspects compared to the
black letter requirements of international human rights law and
perhaps many national jurisdictions. The Lebanon Tribunal
continues this tradition even though its jurisdiction is only over
common crimes under Lebanese law.156
Article 16 of the Statute of the STL outlines the basic rights akin
to those enjoyed by each accused person in international criminal
courts. It guarantees the accused, among other things, equality before

152.
See id. at art. 15 ("A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall
not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt.").
153.
See id. at art. 15(b) ("A suspect who is to be questioned by the
Prosecutor ... shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to questioning, in a language
he or she speaks and understands: ... (b) The right to remain silent, without such
silence being considered in the determination of guilt or innocence, and to be cautioned
that any statement he or she makes shall be recorded and may be used in
evidence. . . .").
154.
See id. at art. 15(c) ("A suspect who is to be questioned by the
Prosecutor ... shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to questioning, in a language
he or she speaks and understands: ... (c) The right to have legal assistance of his or
her own choosing, including the right to have legal assistance provided by the Defence
Office where the interests of justice so require and where the suspect does not have
sufficient means to pay for it. . . .").
See Schomburg, supra note 98, 38 (noting that, amongst other things, the
155.
defendant's choice might be limited by conflicts of interest as in Gotovina); Prosecutor
v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-AR73.1, Decision on Miroslav Separovi's
Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber's Decision on Conflict of Interest and
Finding of Misconduct,
37 (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 4,
2007).
156.
ICTR Statute, supra note 51, at art. 17(3)(f); ICTY Statute, supra note 51,
at art. 18(3)(f); Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 54, at art. 17(4)(f); Rome Statute,
supra note 22, at art. 55; SIERRA LEONE COURT RPE, supra note 111, r. 43(A);
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.7 (1996), entered into force March 14, 1994, amendments
adopted Jan. 8, 1996, r. 42(a) [hereinafter ICTY-RPE]; International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), entered
into force 29 June 1995, r. 43(A) [hereinafter ICTR-RPE]; see also Schabas, supra note
98, at 358, 503.
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the tribunal;157 the right to a fair and public hearing;15 8 and the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the prosecutor beyond
a reasonable doubt.159 The usual minimum guarantees then follow,
including the right to notice of the charges in a language the accused
understands; to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defense
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; to be tried
without undue delay; to examine, or have examined, witnesses under
the same conditions as witnesses against him; to the free assistance
of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in the Tribunal; and not to be compelled to testify against himself or
to confess his guilt.160

B. No Longer Second Class? The Defense as an Equal
Before the Altar of Justice
There are three noteworthy differences between Article 16 of the
Lebanon Tribunal's Statute and its equivalent provisions from all the
other international criminal courts that preceded it. First, the right of
the accused to be tried in his presence is subject to Article 22 which
permits, for the first time in a UN-sponsored tribunal, trials in
absentia.' 6 ' The secretary-general's report noted that trials in
absentia are common in a number of civil law jurisdictions, including
in Lebanon.162 Thus, under Article 22, the proceedings in the
Tribunal may take place in the absence of the accused (a) if he
waives, in writing, his right to be present; (b) if relevant national
authorities fail to render him to the Tribunal; or (c) if he absconds
and cannot otherwise be located after all reasonable steps have been
taken to secure his appearance. In the limited circumstances in which
trials in absentia are held, Article 22 triggers a secondary set of
protections, requiring the Tribunal to ensure, amongst others, that
certain notices are published and that the accused is represented by a
private or publicly funded lawyer from the Defense Office to protect
his interests. 163 If convicted in absentia, an accused person who

See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16(1) ("All accused shall be equal
157.
before the Special Tribunal.").
See id. at art. 16(2) ("The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public
158.
hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special Tribunal for the protection of
victims and witnesses.").
See id. at art. 16(3)(a)-(c) ("The accused shall be presumed innocent until
159.
proved guilty according to the provisions of this Statute .... ").
See id. at art. 16(4)(a)-(h) (detailing the minimum guarantees any accused
160.
person shall enjoy under the statute).
Id. at art. 22(1). See Aptel, supra note 1, at 1121 (discussing the
161.
complications of including this element of inquisitorial proceedings in the STL).
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29, 1 32(b) ("The institution
162.
of trials in absentia is common in a number of civil law legal systems, including
Lebanon's.").
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 22(2).
163.
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subsequently appears may elect to accept the judgment or to be
retried if he had not previously designated counsel of his choosing.164
These in absentia provisions have been invoked in, inter alia, the case
involving Hassan Habib Merhi. His trial opened in January 2014, and
is under consideration for a joinder with other cases in February
2014.165

Second, under Article 16(f), in addition to being entitled to be
informed promptly of the nature of the charges against her, the
accused is separately entitled to "examine all evidence to be used
against him or her during the trial" in accordance with the RPE.166 In
the other international criminal courts, the right of an accused to
examine the evidence against him is seen as an integral aspect of the
right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of
the charges and to examine witnesses against him-both of which are
given further effect through various procedural rules of the
tribunals.167

The travaux pr6paratoires does not explain why this new
language was imported into the fair trial provision common to the
statutes of contemporary international criminal courts. Perhaps the
parties felt it important to clarify the point because of the m6lange of
common and civil law in the procedures applicable in the Tribunal.
Unlike in common law, in civil law systems such as that of Lebanon,
it is the court and more specifically the juge d'instruction, not the
164.
Id. at art. 22(3). Note that there might be difficulty in making this work in
practice. See generally Aptel, supra note 1; Chris Jenks, Notice Otherwise Given: Will in
Absentia Trials at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights? 33
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 57 (2009).

165.
See Press Release, Counsel Assigned to Represent the Rights and Interests
of the Accused Hassan Habib Merhi (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.stltsl.org/en/media/press-releases/defence-office-press-release-counsel-assigned-torepresent-the-rights-and-interests-of-the-accused-hassan-habib-merhi [http://perma.cc/
TEZ-2GY2] (archived February 22, 2014); Press Release, A Joint Hearing on Joinder
Scheduled for 11 February 2014 (Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://www.stltsl.org/en/media/press-releases/04-02-2014-a-joint-hearing-on-joinder-scheduled-for-11february-2014 [http://perma.cc/C7LZ-4922] (archived February 22, 2014). For the
decision authorizing the trial in the absence of Mr. Merhi, see Prosecutor v. Hassan
Habib Merhi, Case No. STL-13-04/I/TC, Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia (Special
Trib. for Leb. Dec. 10, 2013).
166.
Article 16(4) of the STL Statue provides that:
In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to this
Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in
full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in the language which
he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or
her; .. . (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her; (f) To examine all
evidence to be used against him or her during the trial in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16(4).
167.
Id.
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parties, that is in charge of conducting impartial investigations and
developing evidence. 168 With the judges playing a more inquisitorial
role, the obligation to disclose all the "evidence" to be used against the
accused is underscored in the Statute and effectively brings the
procedure in the STL closer to the essentially adversarial common
law system in other ad hoc international criminal courts. In those
courts, it is the prosecution's obligation to secure a fair trial by not
only proving the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but also
informing the accused what he is accused of. Additionally, before the
trial, there is also the obligation to provide the accused the evidence
against him-not only inculpatory but also exculpatory. The latter
would include evidence tending to impeach the credibility of
prosecution witnesses.
The third difference between the Tribunal's fair trial clause and
those of ad hoc international criminal tribunals is that the accused,
under Article 16(5), "may make statements in court at any stage of
the proceedings, provided such statements are relevant to the case at
issue."169 The rule leaves it to the Chamber to determine the
probative value, if any, of such statements. This interesting provision
may reflect the STL's fusion of civil law and common law approaches
and principles. To appreciate its significance, a little foray back into
the history of international criminal tribunals appears helpful.
During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the accused could make
a final statement, without taking the oath. 170 The statement,
generally made at the end of the trial, offered an opportunity for the
defendants to apologize if they wished to do so. In the modern ICTY,
but not the ICTR or the SCSL, a rule was adopted in July 1999 to
allow an unsworn statement to which the Trial Chamber
acquiesced.1 71 Other than that, at other times, counsel speak on
behalf of their clients and in doing so expedite trials by identifying
and narrowing the contentious issues. 17 2 The statement could be
made at various stages, for example, after the prosecution's opening
statement or following the defense's opening statement. The chance
to speak at the end of the process removes the gag over the
defendant. Perhaps not surprisingly, this right appears to have only
been occasionally exercised by the accused.173 It is interesting that a

168.
See RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE, at xvii (2002).
169.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16(5).
170.
IMT Charter, supra note 62, at arts. 24(j), XI(i).
171.
See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, art. 84bis, as amended Oct. 20,
2011, IT/32/Rev.46 (providing that an accused person can make a statement, under the
control of the Chamber, without taking an oath or being cross examined), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules-procedure-evidence/itO32rev46e.pdf
[http://perma.cclXKP5-GK9A] (archived Feb. 21, 2014).
172.
MAY & WIERDA, supra note 168, 294-95.
173.
See id. ("In practice this right has been rarely exercised.").
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similar provision giving the accused a right to make an unsworn oral
or written statement was included in the Rome Statute. 174
Under the statutes and rules of international criminal courts, it
is clear that the accused has a right to represent himself or hire legal
assistance of his choosing (or where he cannot afford counsel, obtain a
publicly funded lawyer). The norm is for the accused to choose legal
representation. The jurisprudence has interpreted these rules to
mean that the accused takes on a secondary role in the conduct of his
defense once he chooses or is afforded public counsel. 75 The gravity of
the charges, the complex and technical nature of proceedings, and the
possibility of self-incrimination and disruptiveness on the part of
recalcitrant defendants all reinforce this position.176 Thus, when an
accused has statements to make, he is typically expected to make
them through his counsel, and when he wishes to make them directly,
he must do so only after first securing the permission of the
Chamber-often through his counsel. 77 Under this model, to directly
address the court, the accused would usually elect to testify on his
own behalf, but even in such circumstances, his evidence would
usually be elicited through an examination in chief conducted by his
defense counsel. 7 8 The option to make unsworn statements, orally or
in writing, without being led by a lawyer does exist, but such
statements are generally perceived as having limited probative value
if untested through prosecution cross-examination.

174.
See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 67(1)(h) ("[T]o make an unsworn
oral or written statement in his or her defense."); International Criminal Court, Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.1, r. 87 (2000) [hereinafter
ICC-RPE] (Rule 84bis: "[Tihe accused may, if he or she wishes, and the Trial Chamber
so decides, make a statement under the control of the Trial Chamber. The accused
shall not be compelled to make a solemn declaration and shall not be examined about
the content of the statement. The Trial Chamber shall decide on the probative value, if
any, of the statement.").
175.
Of course, the scenario is different when an accused decides to represent
himself instead of through counsel.
176.
See Jalloh, supra note 104, at 717 (indicating that statutory language may
qualify the right of a defendant in relation to their counsel, once selected).
177.
Id.
178.
See IMT Charter, supra note 62, at art. 16(b), (d), (e). Article 16(b) gave an
accused, during a preliminary examination or the trial, the right to "give any
explanation relevant to the charges made against him." Article 16(d) conferred the
right to conduct his "own defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of
Counsel." Finally, Article 16(e) gave the "right through himself or through his Counsel
to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense." The Tokyo Tribunal was
more explicit and specified. See IMTFE Charter, supra note 99, at art. 9(d) (providing
that an "accused shall have the right, through himself or through his counsel (but not
through both), to conduct his defense," which included the right to examine witnesses).
None of the modern international criminal courts addressed such a right, except of
course, the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 67(1)(h) (providing
the right of an accused "[t]o make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her
defense").
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In general under the civil law model, including that prevailing in
Lebanon, an accused's decision to have counsel representing him does
not automatically limit his preeminent right to directly participate in
the proceedings, including by making statements in court. 79
However, even in such systems such a right would be subject to
reasonable limits and exclude statements deemed to abuse the court
or otherwise obstruct the proceedings.180 The Statute of the STL
anticipates such concerns by conditioning the right to make
statements at any stage of the proceedings on the proviso that "such
statements are relevant to the case at issue."18 1 Although the rule
does not specify who will determine relevance, this decision would
typically fall to the Trial Chamber. Of course, the accused's ability to
make statements does not obligate the Chamber to accord such
statements any probative value. Indeed, it is up to the Chamber to
assess, at the end of the trial, all statements in the light of all the
evidence to determine whether to accord the statements any
weight.18 2 Interestingly, not even the Rome Statute, which gives an
accused the explicit right "[t]o make an unsworn oral or written
statement in his or her defense" 83 appears as expansive as the broad
right conferred by Article 16(5).184

VI. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE OFFICE: LESSONS FROM
THE SIERRA LEONE COURT

Article 13 (Defense Office) of the Statute of the STL is a seminal
and complex provision. It provides that:
1. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the
Special Tribunal, shall appoint an independent Head of the Defense
Office, who shall be responsible for the appointment of the Office staff
and the drawing up of a list of defense counsel.
2. The Defense Office, which may also include one or more public
defenders, shall protect the rights of the defense, provide support and
assistance to defense counsel and to the persons entitled to legal
assistance, including, where appropriate, legal research, collection of

179.
See Jalloh, supra note 104, at 724 ("In civil law systems, the presence of
counsel is not necessarily seen as divesting the defendant of his right to speak in court
on his own behalf due to the assistance of a lawyer.").
180.
Even though civil law systems liberally permit the use of defendant
statements in the courtroom, such statements cannot be unreasonable to, abuse, or
obstruct courtroom proceedings. See id. at 741.
181.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16(5).
182.
The last sentence reads: "The Chambers shall decide on the probative
value, if any, of such statements." Id.
183.
Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 67(1)(h).
184.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16(5) ("The accused may make
statements in court at any stage of the proceedings, provided such statements are
relevant to the case at issue. The Chambers shall decide on the probative value, if any,
of such statements.").

806

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

[VOL. 47765

LAW

evidence and advice, and appearing before the Pre-Trial Judge or a
Chamber in respect of specific issues. 1 8 5

The mandate of the Defense Office is largely set out in the
second paragraph. But the general statements in this provision
should be read together with the first paragraph-which outlines the
powers of the head of the Defense Office-the RPE, and several
ancillary instruments and directives that are more explicit, flesh out
the core of its essential functions, and clarify several major
ambiguities.18 6 Under Article 13(1), the secretary-general appoints an
"independent" head of the Defense Office, who in turn appoints his
staff and draws up a list of defense counsel.18 7 This suggests that
drawing up a list of lawyers is a primary function. In his report to
the Council, the secretary-general of the United Nations explained
the rationale for the inclusion of the Defense Office in the Statute of
the Tribunal. He observed that there is now a clear "need for a
defense office to protect the rights of suspects and accused" and that
this had "evolved in the practice of UN-based tribunals as part of
'equality of arms,' where the prosecutor's office is an organ of the
tribunal and is financed in its entirety through the budget of the
tribunal."1 88 Thus, the Statute of the Tribunal "institutionalizes the
defense office," whose role will be "to protect the rights of the defense,
draw up the list of defense counsel and provide support and
assistance to defense counsel and persons entitled to such legal

185.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13 (emphasis added).
186.
See, e.g., SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, PRACTICE DIRECTION ON THE
ROLE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEFENCE OFFICE IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
(Mar. 30, 2011); SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, DIRECTIVE ON ASSIGNMENT OF
COUNSEL (Mar. 20, 2009) (as amended Mar. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE ON
ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL] available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/images/Defence
documents/Directive on theAppointment and-Assignment-of Defence CounselMarch_2013_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/8MQV-S4DT] (archived Mar. 9, 2014); SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, LEGAL AID POLICY FOR DEFENCE, (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter
LEGAL
AID
POLICY
FOR
DEFENCE],
available
at
http://www.stltsl.org/en/documents/defence-office-documents/legal-aid-policy-for-defence
[http://perma.cc/DYX4-TJZW] (archived Mar. 9, 2014). In what appears to have been an
unprecedented practice, the then President of the Lebanon Tribunal, Judge Antonio
Cassese, issued an explanatory memorandum explaining the rationale for the various
rules that were ultimately adopted. See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, RULES OF
PROCEDURE

AND

EVIDENCE,

EXPLANATORY

MEMORANDUM

BY

THE

TRIBUNAL'S

PRESIDENT (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?option=
comk2&Itemid=287&id=121Od4590de8b8d6fbd42dbe2f6e3a6Oc2d5&lang=en&task=d
ownload&view=item [http://perma.cc/BLU8-H564] (archived Mar. 9, 2014). Part of the
stated purpose was to "resolve some ambiguities raised by the Statute", including "(4)
the role of the Defence Office" .
(8) the role of an accused in court" . . . "(9) the right
of an accused to self-representation . . . and "(12) the holding of trials in absentia . . .
Id.
187.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(1) ("The Secretary-General, in
consultation with the President of the Special Tribunal, shall appoint an independent
Head of the Defence Office, who shall be responsible for the appointment of the Office
staff and the drawing up of a list of defence counsel.").
188.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report, supra note 29, 1 30.

20141

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

807

assistance."s8 9 Based on Article 13 and the drafting history, one can
essentially discern a four-pronged mandate for the Defense Office,
which is confirmed by the Defense Office practice. This mandate
constitutes its core functions. Each of these elements will be
discussed in turn below, with the analysis emphasizing the language
contained in the Statute. After all, the latter takes primacy and is the
source of authority for all the other subordinate directives and
policies adopted by the court and the Defense Office.

A. The Legal Aid AdministratorRole:
"[D]raw up a list of defense counsel"
Under the first prong of its mandate, as expressed in Article
13(1) of the Statute, the Defense Office shall establish a list of
defense counsel from which the legal representatives of suspects and
accused are drawn for appointment. The simplicity of Article 13(1)
belies the complexities involved in preparing such a list of counsel.
The clause essentially mandates the devising of a new legal aid
system for the Tribunal, if the experience of other courts is any guide,
often while working with limited staff under tight budgets and strict
timelines. Though otherwise unique in its legal nature and stature,
the Defense Office has drawn on the experience and expertise of the
international criminal tribunals that preceded it to set up a Legal Aid
Unit and to adopt several policy directives aimed at advancing the
realization of the suspects and accused's rights to legal
representation.
Essentially, regarding the responsibility to establish a new legal
aid system, a three-step process may be distilled from the practice of
existing international courts and that which is already set out by the
STL. Firstly, the tribunals usually establish basic requirements that
lawyers wishing to represent a suspect or an accused must fulfill.
Anyone seeking to be "listed" on the roster of counsel must fulfill
those pro forma requirements and must complete and submit the
requisite forms and supporting documentation. This essentially
includes a general requirement of a bar license in a national
jurisdiction,19 0 several years' experience in national and or

189.
190.

Id.
STL RPE 58 provides that:

[A] counsel shall be considered qualified . .. if the counsel satisfies the Head of
Defense Office that he: (i) is admitted to practice law in a recognized
jurisdiction ... (ii) has written and oral proficiency [of one of the languages of
the Tribunal]; (iii) has not been . . . disciplined [for violations of bar and ethics
requirements]; (iv) has not been found guilty in criminal that were fair and
impartial and met the requirements of due process . . . (v) has not engaged in
conduct which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable . . . to the administration
of justice . . . (vi) has not [lied about] his qualifications and fitness to
practice . . ..
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international criminal law practice, fluency in one or more of the
official languages of the Tribunal, a statement affirming willingness,
a clear professional record, and availability to take up a provisional or
permanent assignment.' 9 ' The requirements and modalities are then
further fleshed out in a secondary legal document outlining detailed
procedures for the assignment and withdrawal of counsel.192
In the context of the Lebanon Tribunal, which entrusts defense
rights, including that of counsel, to the head of the Defense Office
with ultimate responsibility of drawing up a list of counsel, at least
two approaches appeared to exist for devising a counsel listing
regime. To begin, the Defense Office might have taken the lead in
drawing up the requirements for the roster of counsel based on the
comparative research of the similar requirements in Lebanese and
international criminal tribunals. It would be typical to have internal
consultations with the judges, registrar, and president of the
Tribunal and with other interested actors, such as the Lebanese
defense bar and NGOs. The Defense Office would then adopt a
practice directive on the assignment of counsel setting out the
requirements and notifying the Lebanese as well as the international
defense bars of those requirements. A key advantage of this approach
would be the flexibility that the Defense Office would have had to
periodically revise the requirements based on direct experience with
their practical application.
A second option, which was generally followed in the other UN
courts, was as follows. The Defense Office, in consultation with the
court's administration, might have established the general
requirements that defense counsel must meet to qualify for
assignment. These would then be incorporated into the formal RPE of
the Tribunal as well as into a more detailed directive on counsel
assignment that the registrar, instead of head of defense matters,
would adopt. The judges, under Article 28 of the Statute, are
empowered to adopt such rules. 9 3 There is therefore nothing to bar

See RPE, supra note 16, at r. 58; see also id. at r. 59(B) (providing additional
requirements such as that the lawyer must possess relevant competence, must have at
least seven years of relevant experience, and must have indicated her willingness to
work for an indigent accused).
191.
Id.
192.
The STL Directive on the Appointment and Assignment of Defense Counsel,
adopted and entered into force on March 20, 2009, is the governing instrument. See
DIRECTIVE ON ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL, supra note 186. This is consistent with the

practice of other courts. In the SCSL, a similar instrument was adopted by the
registrar. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, Directive on the Assignment of
Counsel, in CONSOLIDATED LEGAL TEXTS FOR THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
191 (Charles Jalloh eds., 2007) [hereinafter SCSL DIRECTIVE ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF
COUNSEL].

193.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 28 ("The judges of the Special
Tribunal shall, as soon as practicable after taking office, adopt Rules of Procedure and
Evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial, trial and appellate proceedings, the admission

2014]

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

809

them from incorporating the general requirements for the lawyers
that would be appearing before them within the rules of the court of
which they are primary legislators. In fact, their rules provided the
general requirements that were then fleshed out in the subsequent
directive on counsel assignment. Given the specific mandate of the
Defense Office to draw up the list of counsel and to effectively run the
legal aid scheme, this approach is ultimately less desirable in the
context of the STL and was not used because the head of the defense
was perfectly capable of carrying out his mandate using the first
option above. 194 In addition, this makes sense since that office would
then be responsible for administering a legal aid policy. This is yet
another advance compared to the practice of the SCSL, where the
registrar, though informally acknowledging the operational
independence of the OPD, was formally responsible for the adoption
and ultimately the implementation of the rules in the Directive on the

Assignment of Counsel and Other Ancillary Instruments.'"5

Once the directive on counsel is drawn up and enters into force,
the second step in Tribunal practice typically requires the Defense
Office to maintain an up-to-date roster of counsel to be presented to
those suspects and accused persons requiring legal assistance. In all
the ad hoc international tribunals including the Sierra Leone Court,
the suspect or accused must show that he is "indigent" by filling out
the requisite declaration of means form in order to qualify for legal
aid. The threshold of proof of indigence is not necessarily high.19 6 It is
essentially presumed when an accused is found not to have sufficient
financial and other resources to hire and remunerate the counsel of
his choice to defend him for the expected duration of his case.
Equally, in the ad hoc tribunals, the intermediate category of
"partially indigent" suspects and accused persons also benefit from
publicly funded counsel. Partial indigence exists when the suspect or
accused is found to have some resources that could be used toward his
defense but are insufficient to cover the costs of his own private
lawyer.' 9 7 Of course, the applicant's financial situation is assessed,
taking into account all his means.19 8 These would include assets or

of evidence, the participation of victims, the protection of victims and witnesses and
other appropriate matters and may amend them, as appropriate.").
194.
In other tribunals, the formal rules were adopted by the registrar.
195.
See SCSL DIRECTIVE ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL, supra note 192.
See id. at art. 4(A) (stating that "[a] person shall be considered indigent if
196.
he does not have the means to engage Counsel of his choice to represent him"); see also
id. at art. 4(B) (providing that "[a] person shall be considered to be partially indigent if
he does not have sufficient means to engage Counsel of his choice to represent him at
proceedings before the Special Court but has means to contribute to the payment of
Counsel for such representation").
197.
Id. at art. 4(B).
198.
See id. at art. 6 ("A Suspect or Accused who requests the assignment of
Counsel, must fulfill the requirement of indigence or partial indigence, defined in
Article 4 of this Directive, in order to have Counsel assigned to him.").
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other property that he owns, family or social benefits to which he may
be entitled, and what his spouse owns.19 9 All of this is irrespective of
where in the world such assets may be situated.2 00 The categories of
indigent or partially indigent notwithstanding, most accused persons
in international criminal trials have availed themselves of publicly
funded counsel. The small number of suspects that have chosen to
retain private defense lawyers or to represent themselves stand as
exceptions to the general rule.
It is settled in the jurisprudence of the tribunals that the right to
publicly funded counsel does not necessarily mean that there is a
right to choose specific counsel. In practice however, the Defense
Office could and should play an important advisory role in identifying
experienced counsel suitable for the particular suspect or accused.
The curriculum vitae of experienced counsel are typically provided to
suspects and accused to make a selection, though given the possibility
of trials in absentia provided for in the Statute of the STL, this might
not always be possible. Importantly, depending on the available
budget for defense issues and whether the accused are in custody, it
is not unheard of for prospective meetings to occur between counsel
and the suspects in custody before counsel assignments are formally
made. This is a prudent course of action to ensure that the accused
and his counsel get along before such a big decision as representation
is taken. Confidence between counsel and client is always important,
but it becomes even more so as the pressure builds in what are
typically high profile internationally observed trials.
The third general step in the counsel appointment and selection
process in the tribunals is that once an accused has settled on a
choice of counsel, assuming proof of lack of means, a formal
appointment will then have to take place. The appointment may be
provisional or permanent, depending on the circumstances. In the
STL, this appointment is made by the head of the Defense Office,
much like the principal defender does in the SCSL. 201 In the other ad
hoc tribunals, the registrar-the technical manager of the legal aid
on the
based
appointment
the
makes
system-formally
recommendation of the head of the defense. 20 2 Needless to say, a
resort to the registrar in the STL context would have been

199.
Id.
200.
Id.
LEGAL AID POLICY FOR DEFENCE, supra note 186, §§ 1.1, 4.9. Depending on
201.
whether a decision is made to furnish, much like the OPD in the SCSL had to do, not
just one lawyer but a team of lawyers and other professionals working to represent the
accused. In fact, under the Legal Aid Policy, a standard defense team includes a cocounsel, a legal officer, a case manager, an investigator, and a language assistant. Note
that, in addition to this team, counsel may also request the assistance of ad hoc
experts. Id.
DIRECTIVE ON ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL supra note 186, at art. 18.
202.
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inappropriate given its Statute's conferring of primary responsibility
for this function on the Defense Office.
Power to appoint implies power to withdraw, replace, or revoke
the appointment of counsel. 203 However, as a general rule, the
presumption is that once appointed, counsel shall represent the
accused to the finality of the case. Replacement of counsel is only
permitted in the most exceptional circumstances. This threshold is
intended to be and is often treated as being very high. Consequently,
the later such a request is made in the proceedings, which can
emanate either from the accused or his counsel, or sometimes both,
the less wiggle room the head of the Defense Office has to meet that
request. A withdrawal of an appointment at a late stage, generally
after the trial has started, may derail the trial of an accused, so the
permission or at least consultation of the trial judges, who have
inherent power to manage the trials, may be prudent and is even
required under the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel.204 A
complementary practice could even be prescribed in the rules. Under
this scenario, once the trial has started, requests for termination of
an assignment should be made to the Trial Chamber, which would
then satisfy itself that the request is not made in bad faith or
otherwise designed to delay the proceedings. 205
As already observed, the idea contained in the Statute of
"drawing up a list" of counsel connotes a simple administrative act or
process. However, stripped of its simplicity, the phrase essentially
requires the Defense Office to devise an entire legal aid scheme for
the STL, thereby giving practical content to the right to counsel for
suspects and accused persons. This has led to the adoption of a host of
ancillary instruments including a formal legal aid policy. 2 06 In
addition, Article 13 of the Statute is silent as to who has
responsibility for certain related matters, for example, the payment of
counsel contracted for legal aid purposes. But the funding allocation
for legal aid necessarily comes from the registrar. Administration of
the funds is different, however, and is essentially a shared
responsibility in the sense that the assessment of funds owed takes
place in the Legal Aid Unit of the Defense Office while payment is

203.
See id. at art. 34 (outlining the power to withdraw or suspend appointed
counsel).
204.
See id. (providing for consultation of pre-trial judge of the chamber before
withdrawal is approved).
205.
See Jalloh,supra note 104, at 714 (explaining that termination of counsel is
typically only permitted in exceptional circumstances, often only during the pre-trial
phase).
206.
The Defense Office, in exercise of this mandate, adopted a Legal Aid Policy
for the Defence on September 9, 2011. See LEGAL AID POLICY FOR DEFENCE, supra note
186 (covering all aspects of the representation of suspects and accused, before the STL,
including counsel fees, costs of investigations, expert witnesses/consultants, and
general administrative expenses).
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made by the financial officer in the Registry. 2 07 The head of the
Defense Office is in principle the administrator of legal aid, while the
registrar has overall responsibility for the financial health of the
Tribunal.
By implication, it follows from the statutory mandate to draw up
a list of counsel that the Defense Office also has the corollary duty to
ensure that counsel is paid. This requires that a level of
remuneration as well as a payment system be developed. Such a
payment system could be developed in-house by the Defense Office, or
alternately, by another office designated by the registrar in
consultation with the head of the Defense Office. The good choice was
thus made to set up a Legal Aid Unit within the Defense Office.2 08
This means that the initial processing of legal aid fees are, in the first
instance, assessed by the Defense Office before such funds are then
disbursed by the Tribunal's finance officers.2 09
In creating a payment arrangement, the STL Defense Office had
to determine whether to use the lump sum payment system that has
been employed in some of the other internationalized tribunals, or
whether to design an entirely new payment arrangement taking into
account the specificities of the Tribunal. The end result was a mixed
system that, depending on the stage of the trial, constitutes a
combination of hourly, monthly fees, and lump sum payments. 210
There are several examples of legal aid payment schemes from
the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ECCC, and the OPD in the Sierra Leone Court.
Basically, those schemes offered various possibilities. In the ICTY, a
lump sum system with case ranking criteria (Level 1 (medium), Level
2 (difficult), Level 3 (very difficult), or Level 3.5 (extremely
difficult/leadership)) and a ceiling was used at the trial phase,
whereas in the ICTR an hourly rate with a monthly ceiling system
was employed. 2 11
The Defense Office necessarily considered the core principles
that the ICC identified when it devised its own legal aid payment
scheme. 212 These are equality of arms between the Prosecution and

207.
See id. § 11.1 (discussing the payment of counsel).
208.
See id. § 11.4 (outlining the delegation of legal aid decision-making
authority).
209.
Id. at 5, 32-33.
210.
See id. § 11.1 ("Payment of counsel included in the LAP can take the shape
of: a) hourly remuneration; b) monthly fees; or c) a lump sum.").
211.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, ICCASP/3/16, REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES ON OPTIONS FOR ENSURING
ADEQUATE DEFENCE COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED PERSONS $ 15, Annex 1 (Aug. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-16-_defence
counsel English.pdf.
212.
Id. $ 16.
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Defense; 213 objectivity, in the sense of ensuring that resource
allocation reflects the specific needs of the case as opposed to the
standing of team members; transparency, guaranteeing sufficient
budgetary oversight over public funds without breaching lawyerclient confidentiality or threatening the autonomy of the defense
teams; continuity, building sufficient flexibility within the system to
adapt to changing conditions that prioritize the interests of justice;
and, finally, the principle of economy, ensuring that legal aid, as part
of public money, only covers necessary and reasonable costs required
for a proper defense. 2 14
At the Sierra Leone Court, a decision was made to model the
contract payment scheme on the Very High Cost Cases system used
by the Legal Aid Commission of the United Kingdom. 215 This resulted
in a system that established a legal services contract between the
defense team, on the one part, and the OPD acting on behalf of the
registrar and therefore the court, on the other. An hourly fee was
fixed for each team member, though there was a cap on the hourly
and monthly fees that can be paid by the Sierra Leone Court based on
pre-agreed hours for each of the main stages of the trial. The
contracts were thus predicated on detailed "stage plans" as well as
task lists tracking the work to be performed by each team member.
In practice, this system provided a disincentive for counsel to
balloon costs. It nevertheless proved to be dissatisfactory to attorneys,
excepting those in the Charles Taylor trial (who were exempted from
that requirement), who spent many hours complying with the
detailed billing requirements. Given the unpredictable nature of trial
processes as well, counsel and their teams often had to seek "special
consideration" from the registrar of the court, a euphemism for
requests for additional money to cover unanticipated slowness in
trials or unbudgeted costs. Ultimately, in the most complex case
before the tribunal (that of former-Liberian President Charles
Taylor), the OPD implicitly acknowledges the limitations of this
regime. With the acquiescence of the registrar, the OPD therefore
agreed to contract a fixed monthly fee for counsel and his
subordinates so that, among other things, the burden of
administrative compliance with detailed billing requirements would
be minimized. This was seen as a way to free up counsel to focus on
the more pressing demands of a high profile trial while maintaining
oversight and accountability in requiring submission of a pro forma

213.
Id. Fees for members of the defense team were pegged to the salaries paid
in the Office of the Prosecutor and at the ad hoc Tribunals. These were then increased
by a certain percentage to account for increased expenses arising from appointment. Id.
Id. 1 16.
214.
215.
See Skilbeck, supra note 103, at 81 (discussing the controversy surrounding
the Very High Cost system and the ultimate decision to use this structure).
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invoice before payment (but without exacting billing requirements
that might be found in private practice).
B. The Public Defender Role: Appearing Before the Pretrial
Judge or a Chamber in Respect to Specific Issues
Article 13(2) of the Statute of the STL provides that the Defense
Office "may also include one or more public defenders.". 2 16 While not
the mandatory "shall," the use of may suggests that the intent of the
parties was to create the option of having a mixed Defense Office that
is on the one hand staffed with lawyers that can serve as public
defenders while maintaining, in light of the thrust of Article 13(1), a
list of defense counsel that can be assigned to suspects and accused
persons. Regrettably, neither Article 13(2) nor the travaux
preparatoires spelled out the envisaged role of the public defenders
This ambiguity left room for at least two possible interpretations.
First, while the role of duty counsel is not explicitly mentioned in
Article 13(2), as it is in Rule 45 of the SCSL RPE, the first part of the
sentence implies that the head of the office or his staff could serve as
public defenders for a suspect or accused. 217 As part of this, it seems
equally implied that they could appear in court, such as during the
initial appearance. At the same time, the Defense Office could provide
support to individual defendants, through legal research and advice,
and might even in certain circumstances have rights of audience
before the judges with regard to fairness of proceedings in respect to a
specific defendant. 218
The second plausible reading is that the mandate of the Defense
Office in Article 13 is primarily to manage the legal aid system of the
court, and that while the head of the office can hire lawyers as part of
his staff to run the public defense system, they need not play any role
in representing suspects and accused persons in court proceedings.2 19
The exception would be that in their role supporting defense counsel,
the public defenders in the Defense Office may "appear before the

216.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(2) (emphasis added).
217.
Compare id. (containing no reference to the role of duty counsel), with RPE,
supra note 16, at r. 45(B) (mandating the Defense Office provide "legal advice and
assistance by duty counsel").
218.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(2) (providing for the
"support ... to the persons entitled to legal assistance"); RPE, supra note 16, at r.
57(e)-(f) (permitting "rights of audience in relation to matters of general interest to
defence teams" to the head of Defense Office); see also Gillett & Schuster, supra note
24, at 891-92 (providing a brief description of the ambiguity in the role of the Defense
Office).
219.
RPE, supra note 16, at r. 57(I); see Gillett & Schuster, supra note 24, at
891-92 (explaining the "somewhat blurred" distinction between the independence of
the Defense Office and the representation of specific accused).
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Pre-Trial judge or a Chamber in respect of specific issues." 220 As
worded, Article 13 assumes that there are defense counsel. It also
assumes that it is they who benefit from the support provided by the
Defense Office. Such may include the provision of public defenders
that would appear in court in respect of specific matters, presumably
on the basis of prior instructions of defense counsel. In any event, the
use of may in the rule appeared to indicate that it is permissive and
that the Defense Office can choose, taking all factors into
consideration, not to provide public defender services even if it does
possess the statutory powers to do so. 221
This ambiguity in the rule suggested that an early decision had
to be made whether to provide, as is done in the Sierra Leone Court,
limited legal representation to defendants (suspects and accused)
before the court. The experience of the SCSL's OPD and the existing
international criminal tribunals shows that each of the
aforementioned approaches has its advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, public defenders within the Defense Office may be
assigned to represent the defendants at various stages, when for
whatever reason they do not have counsel. This function of the public
defenders would be particularly important in the early phases of the
judicial process, including periods when a suspect might be under
questioning by the prosecution and wish to be advised of his legal
rights but has not yet acquired the status of an accused. 222 The
assigned public defenders would represent suspects and, once
arrested, the accused persons up to the assignment of provisional or
permanent counsel.
Indeed, initial representation of accused persons would be
required and might be particularly useful given the possibility of in
absentia trials. Similarly, it is critical in the immediate aftermath of
arrest and transfer to the Tribunal, including during the
arraignment, when it is often difficult to quickly identify and hire
private counsel while upholding the accused's right to be promptly
brought before a competent judge to be informed of the charges
against him. 22 3 In addition, during the trial there may be occasions
when counsel is simply unavailable, say for health or other reasons,
to attend court. Public defenders assigned to a specific case could step

220.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(2) (indicating that such
appearances would be a way of providing support and assistance to defense counsel).
221.
See id. ("The Defence Office ... may also include one or more public
defenders.").
222.
See Wilson, supra note 24, at 8 (describing how the OPD and Duty Counsel
serve the important function of stepping in during the "crucial initial stages" to offer
advice before she is formally assigned counsel).
223.
See John R.W.D. Jones et al., The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 211, 215-16 (2004) (describing specific instances in which the Defense
Office was very useful during initial appearances).
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in to prevent unnecessary adjournments and delays to the trial in
these circumstances.
A key lesson from the Charles Taylor trial illustrates the latter
point. 224 At the opening of his trial in June 2004, the accused
terminated his counsel to spotlight a range of issues from inadequate
provisioning of his defense team to inadequate time given to his
defense team to prepare his defense to inadequate investigative
support for his defense team. 225 The accused was convinced that,
absent a radical change, he would be unable to secure a fair trial from
the SCSL. 226 So, he wrote a letter to the registrar of the court and the
Trial Chamber in which he terminated the services of his provisional
counsel and purportedly undertook to represent himself.2 27 The
Chamber, undeterred by counsel's position that he was ethically
unable to act for a client that did not wish to be represented,
appointed counsel to represent the accused for the duration of the
trial, and subsequently, for the duration of the hearing. 228 Counsel
refused the court's order in respect of both directives and walked out
of the courtroom.2 2 9
By being absent from the court, the accused was not available to
represent himself. This meant that even if he had been acting as his
own counsel, the proceedings would have had to have been stopped
until he was brought to the court-the suggestion of the
Prosecution.23 0 The Chamber rejected the prosecutor's proposal, and
having determined that duty counsel was present, appointed duty
counsel to act as counsel for the accused for the purposes of the
opening of the trial.2 3 ' This critical backstop function enabled the

224.
See Wilson, supra note 24, at 6 (describing the Charles Taylor experience as
a "paradigmatic example of the ongoing struggle to define rules and structures to
protect the independence of defense counsel, and the defense office in general, in
international criminal tribunals").
225.
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01, Transcript,
9-11 (June 4, 2007); see Wilson, supra note 24, at 6 (requesting adequate time and
facilities for the defense team).
226.
See Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 ("I have only ... one
counsel against a Prosecution team fully composed of nine lawyers. This is neither fair
nor just.").
227.
See id. at 9-11 (providing a letter to the registrar in which the accused
terminates Mr. Khan as his representation and elects to represent himself).
See id. at 27 (directing Mr. Jalloh, as duty counsel, to "take charge of Mr.
228.
Taylor's case" throughout the opening statements).
The Court warned Mr. Khan, "you have not been given leave to
229.
withdraw .... You have not been permitted to leave . . . . There is a directive of this
court asking you to sit down and to represent your client, which you apparently have
defied, and now you are walking out with further defiance, without leave." To which he
responded, "I am no longer instructed in this case ... Your Honor, I must. I do
apologize." See id. at 25-27.
230.
Id. at 252.
231.
This writer, in his capacity then as legal advisor to the OPD and head of
the Defense Sub-Office in The Hague, was appointed duty counsel to represent Mr.
Taylor.
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proceedings to continue as the court would have had to adjourn the
hearing had OPD counsel not been present.2 32 Viewed in this context,
the importance of the Defense Office providing and assigning public
defenders to act as "duty counsel" in specific cases cannot be
overemphasized. It is not only in line with the interests of the
accused, but also consistent with the broader interests of the court
(and its ability to control its process) as well as the overall interests of
justice. 233 The duty counsel system is employed in virtually all of the
tribunals. This has not yet proved to be a concern since no suspect
has been arrested.
On the other hand, assigning public defenders from the Defense
Office to suspects and accused poses some serious challenges. Firstly,
and most importantly, the same public defenders cannot represent
different accused due to actual or potential conflict of interests. 234
Secondly, representation must be circumscribed to specific issues
consistent with the spirit of Article 13(2). Otherwise, the danger,
based on the experience of the OPD in the Sierra Leone Court, is that
the head of the Defense Office and his staff could find themselves in a
battle with counsel subsequently assigned to represent the suspects
and accused. 2 35 The moment Defense Counsel is assigned, only he
would have the duty to represent the accused; a residual duty to play
shadow counsel to defend the accused would not exist in the public
defender. This would be so even if the Defense Office still had the
overriding obligation to "protect the rights of the defence." 236 In the
legal framework of the STL, to the extent that a prior lawyer-client
relationship existed between the public defender and the accused, it
should be considered to have lapsed or terminated immediately
following the assignment of counsel.237 At that stage, in order to avoid

232.
See Wilson, supra note 24, at 7 (highlighting the crucial role of the OPD in
the proceeding).
233.
See id. (describing how the duty counsel system of the OPD provided a
convenient and effective vehicle to 'fill the gap' of Mr. Khan's absence; "stepping on
with a moment's notice" is precisely what the office was "designed to do").
234.
See Jones et al., supra note 223, at 213 ("[Tlhere was potentially a grave
conflict of interest in the Defence Office's representing accused who are charged with
many of the same crimes and who might well, therefore, implicate each other in the
course of their defence.").
235.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 49 (describing the lack of trust
between the offices); Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Written
Reasons for the Decision on Application by Counsel for the Third Accused to Withdraw
from the Case,
6-10 (June 19, 2006).
236.
STL Statute, supranote 5, at art. 13(2).
237.
In the experience of the author, this is easier said than done. While he has
no empirical evidence to support this contention in his experience at the Sierra Leone
Court, OPD lawyers continued to see the accused as their clients even after counsel
had been assigned to them. The fact that there was a solicitor-client confidentiality
between the accused helped underscore this feeling. As noted by Alison Thompson &
Michelle Staggs:
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professional conflicts, discussion of the client's case by the public
defender should only take place with the approval of assigned
counsel.
On balance, the benefits of the Defense Office providing limited
representation outweigh the costs. That said, if the lessons of Sierra
Leone are of any guidance, the parameters of such representation
must be strictly delimited to avoid any conflicts of interest as well as
subsequent competition between public defenders and privately
assigned counsel. It would seem that-partly because of the experience
with some of these tensions within the defense family in Freetown,
Judge Cassese, who had been an independent expert on the SCSL,
played a crucial role in clarifying the role of the Defense Office in the
STL RPE and in a subsequent practice directive that spoke to the
rights of audience for the head of the office and his staff.2 38 That
document addressed a range of important issues that had been the
source of tremendous tension between the OPD and the independent
counsel before the SCSL. These included presence of Defense Office
counsel in court, the ability to make written and oral submissions to
the court, the right to receive information provided by particular
defense teams, the duty not to provide any opinions on the factual
and legal matters in the case, confidentiality of case documents
shared with them, and simple forms to request standing to attend
hearings.

Some counsels have gone so far as to claim that their client has appeared to
trust them less due to the interference of Duty Counsel, who they perceive to
have undermined the privileged nature of their relationship . . . . The fact that
Duty Counsel are themselves fully qualified lawyers, often with substantial
litigation experience, who have likely formed a close relationship with the
accused during the initial phases of the trial, may mean that there is a danger
for them to become too close or involved with the Accused . . .. [D]efense
lawyers are generally unaccustomed to any sort of outside interference, given
their normal position of independence, and are unfamiliar with this sharing of
duties regarding their client, hence meaning that this novel kind of
relationship is not always easily negotiated.
THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 49.
238.
See the various roles delineated for the Defense Office vis-A-vis Defense
Counsel in Rules of Procedure and Evidence, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 6, at r.57 (amended
2013); Practice Direction on the Role of the Head of the Defence Office in Proceedings
Before the Tribunal, STL/PD/2011/04, 2 (Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter STL-RPE],
available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?option=com k2&Itemid=288&id=287
Ofd3d7d0e43e037f9dc453603a9cO55b&lang-en&task=download&view=item
[http://perma.cclYP5K-9LQ7] (archived Feb. 21, 2014).
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C. Logistical Support Role: "[P]rovidesupport and
assistancefor Defense Counsel and to the persons
entitled to legal assistance"
Under Article 13(2), the Defense Office shall "provide support
and assistance to defense counsel and to persons entitled to legal
assistance."2 3 9 This means that the office is expected to offer a
measure of centralized institutional support and resources for the
defense akin to that available to the attorneys in the office of the
prosecution. Much of that support is to be directed at addressing the
needs of defense counsel. However, the broad language of the
provision does not preclude the possibility of the office providing
support to others, such as suspects and accused opting for selfrepresentation, for example through legal research, the evidence
collection, and advice. 240 This reading is confirmed by Rule 57 of the
RPE. 24 1
With respect to legal research, the experience of the OPD in the
Sierra Leone Court has been that it is hard to have a single office
with limited staff providing legal research assistance to a large
number of defense teams-even when a tribunal only has a small
number of cases. 242 Generally, while some defense counsel relied on
the office for various types of research support, others sharply
criticized the OPD for providing irrelevant or inadequate legal
research assistance to defense teams. 243 The attitude of the office has
also been considered "reactive" instead of proactive in its approach to
the needs of counsel. 244
For its part, the office offered two major responses to these
criticisms. Firstly, since the primary responsibility for research lies
with the defense team, the office could not interfere in the work of the
defense counsel and their legal assistants except when invited to do
so. 245 Secondly, the office feared that offering too much legal research
support in one trial, in relation to the filing of defense motions, for
example, could lead its small legal staff to be "conflicted out."

239.
STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(2).
240.
See id. (listing "appearing before the Pre-Trial Judge or a Chamber" as an
example of the type of support offered by the Defense Office). However, that support
logically does not apply to instances of self-representation.
241.
See STL-RPE, supra note 238, at r. 57(E)(ii) (mandating that the head of
Defense Office provide "adequate facilities to ... persons entitled to legal assistance in
preparation of a case").
242.
Id.
243.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 51 (noting interviews in which
actual counsel complained that the Office has periodically provided irrelevant research
of little assistance).
244.
See id. at 51-52 (describing how the Office of the Principal Defender
provided legal research only when asked).
245.
See id. at 51 n.236 (referencing the Written Comment of Defense Office
given in September 2006).
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Commentators have found those explanations wanting, suggesting
that the office instead should have proactively offered research on big
picture issues of common interest to the defense and that this would
have not entailed issues of conflict of interest. 246
At a basic level, a fully dedicated office conducting research
support on legal issues would offer welcome relief for defense counsel
under the pressures of litigation. Defense counsel often engage both
oral and written advocacy for clients, usually facing complex factual
and legal allegations regarding serious international crimes;
additionally, defense counsel usually operate under tight budgets and
timelines with limited staff.247 A number of observations seem
warranted based on this author's experience. These observations offer
insight as to why the formula reached by Rule 57(E)(i), under which
defense lawyers can request support or the Defense Office may
proprio motu offer legal research, memoranda, or other advice, was
the correct one.
To begin, the OPD had a tense and inherently contradictory
mandate. The office had overall responsibility to review, assess, and
approve defense counsel's legal bills, a function that in other
international criminal courts is left wholly to a different section of the
Registry. 248 This mandate was consistent with the OPD's supervisory
function to ensure that counsel, as contractors, complied fully with
the requisite administrative and financial regulations of the court.
However, discharge of this mandate created tension between the
support and supervisory roles of the office. With lawyers frequently
threatening to dispute and actually disputing their OPD-assessed
legal fees with higher authorities within the Registry, a poisonous
environment emerged where at least some of the lawyers openly
questioned whether theirs and their client's interests were
necessarily coincident with those of the OPD, which, for good or ill,
seemed to stand in opposition to them. The irony is that in playing
this role, the OPD, which had the least to gain from the situation,
effectively served as a buffer between the defense counsel and the
registrar. It sheltered the latter from exposure to the tsunami of
concerns that defense counsel typically suffered. The budget struggle
ultimately served to underline the importance of the Office of the
Defender as an independent office controlling its own budget.
Second, while a general collection of legal materials might be
helpful legal research for some defense teams, the reality of defending

246.
See id. at 52 (describing the various ways in which the OPD could provide
useful support).
247.
In that sense, the research support is particularly welcome because in
principle at least, it would avoid multiple defense teams spending significant time
researching the same issues. See, e.g., Skilbeck, supra note 103, at 83 (noting that
defense teams at the Sierra Leone Court were limited from billing for hours spent
researching issues that had already been substantially researched for other teams).
248.
This is the case, for example, at the ICC as well as in the STL.
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international crimes is that providing meaningful legal assistance for
defense counsel will require more than a passing familiarity with the
details of a case. This implies access to evidentiary materials within
the possession of the defense, based on the permission of defense
counsel. Even assuming that conflict of interest concerns did not
arise, defense counsel, not unlike other litigation counsel, usually
play their cards close to their chests with respect to the ultimate
defense strategy they and their clients plan to use during the trial. 249
In such an environment, where counsel also receive massive
disclosure from the prosecution, much of which is usually subject to
some form of protective measures for witnesses, it is easy to see that
confidentiality issues alone will constitute a significant hurdle for
counsel and Defense Office staff. Fortunately, under the directives
and other instruments, the contracting defense lawyers in the STL
could choose to share confidential filings and other evidence with the
Defense Office generally or on a case-by-case basis. On balance, this a
wise compromise.
The Defense Office in the STL is statutorily decoupled from the
Registry. Thus, a cancerous tension in its mandate has been removed.
In this regard, it is notable that, under Rule 57, the staff from the
office is explicitly mandated to provide research support even though
they are also explicitly barred from becoming embroiled in the factual
matters of specific cases. In any case, they can aim to provide
substantial support to defense counsel and self-representing accused
persons, especially in the early part of case investigations. As part of
this, the Defense Office should seek to provide general support, such
as maintaining a library of materials relating to, amongst other
things, preliminary challenges of jurisdiction; collecting relevant
national and international case law; offering introductory seminars
for defense team members; and informing counsel of developments
within Lebanon and elsewhere that could affect their work.2 50 This
would be appropriate given the responsibility the office is given to
ensure continuing legal education for assigned lawyers as well as its
overall supervision of their work, including the ability to initiate
disciplinary proceedings or to have lawyers removed from a case or

249.
See THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 110, at 45-46 (discussing the process
involved in planning a defense strategy).
The Office has already begun hosting symposiums. See Frangois Roux, Head
250.
of the Defence Office, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Opening Speech at Seminar:
Defending Before International Criminal Courts: Pleading Guilty or Not Guilty (Mar. 4,
2010), available at http://www.stl-tsL.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-stl/defence/
defence-officelopening-statement-by-francois-roux-from-the-seminar-defence-before[http://perma.cclTR8A-YABX]
international-criminal-courts-to-plead-guilty-or-not-guilty
(archived Mar. 9, 2014). It is unclear whether it is already gathering research on these
pertinent issues as well.
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fees withheld for failure to fulfill their duties. 251 Once the trials get
under way, as they did recently, the office could offer counsel general
litigation support assistance such as summarizing daily the
transcripts of proceedings.
Besides legal research support, Article 13(2) envisages the
Defense Office assisting in evidence gathering. 252 This is an
important function to which the new office should pay close attention
to offset the increasing imbalance between defense and prosecution
investigations. Indeed, a key advantage the prosecution has enjoyed
in international criminal tribunals is the benefit of a centralized office
wherein an entire unit, staffed with skilled professional investigators,
is dedicated solely to conducting investigations and gathering and
providing evidence to the attorneys for use during the various trials.
Many of those investigators have participated in large-scale
investigations in other international tribunals or their national
systems. At the SCSL, each defense team was offered two
investigators to assist in the preparation of its case. Hired on a shortterm contract by the OPD, those investigators were attached to and
answerable only to the defense teams that assigned and supervised
their work. While many of these investigators contributed
meaningfully to the important work of the defense teams, many of
those investigators were not as experienced and skilled as those
engaged by the investigative unit of the prosecution.2 53 In some
cases, some of them failed to perform their duties in a manner that
comported with the Tribunal's confidentiality rules, for instance,
thereby leading to their prosecution for contempt of court.
Though the defense does not have the burden of proof (only a
burden to raise a reasonable doubt), there is an obvious benefit in
raising the standard of investigators. The Defense Office in the STL
might consider establishing a centralized investigative or evidence
unit with specific defense teams being assigned specific investigators.
In the context of the Tribunal, it is highly likely that many of those
investigators will be drawn from among those that were engaged in
the international commission that preceded its establishment.
Besides providing a strong foundational basis for further defense
investigations, those investigators will offer the defendants a

251.

See DIRECTIVE ON ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL, supra note 186, at 21, 24

(providing procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of appointment or assignment
of counsel).
252.
See STL Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(2) ('The Defence Office ... shall
protect the rights of the defence, provide support and assistance to defence counsel and
to the persons entitled to legal assistance, including, where appropriate, legal research,
collection of evidence and advice . . . .").
253.
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 116, at 26 (comparing the Defense
team's single investigator to the Investigations Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor
which is comprised of both international and national investigators).
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significant advantage of familiarity with the crime base and existing
networks for use in any follow-up matters. 254
Not only the lack of investigators to gather evidence but also lack
of other logistical support-such as access to basic infrastructure,
equipment, and other materials-has proven to be a significant
hurdle for the defense in other tribunals. This includes difficulty
obtaining office space, computers, printers, photocopiers, office
supplies, and vehicles. The new Defense Office will have to do the
necessary lobbying for sufficient allocations to ensure that the
defense is not disadvantaged in these various respects. 255
D. Assisting to Ensure the Health and Welfare of the Accused
Another important if only implicit function of the Defense Office
is to ensure the health and welfare of the different accused persons
that may be arrested and put in the Tribunal's custody. So far,
despite several indictments, none of the suspects are in custody. That
might change in the future. If it does, the individual defense teams
would likely not have the time and resources to address detention
issues of their clients. 256 Moreover, the issues of welfare in detention,
such as certain due process and liberty interests, differ in substance
and procedure from the legal issues surrounding international
criminal trials. The defenders within the office, semipermanent staff
at the tribunals, have the unique opportunity to develop research and
gain a thorough understanding of the legal issues surrounding the
257
protection of the health and welfare of the suspects and accused.
Issues regarding conditions of detention have fallen to different
persons at the international tribunals. During the initial stages of
detention, even before the suspects have been formally appointed
counsel, they often face health issues that need be addressed. Such
instances, similar to initial proceedings, are best dealt with by the
Defense Office. During the trial, although counsel provide full and
adequate support for legal issues, they are not specifically focused on
the health and welfare of the accused. In addition, the health and
welfare issues encountered by one accused often overlap with those
faced by another, and thus might be more efficiently addressed

254.
See Aptel, supra note 1, at 1112-13 (describing how the prosecutor shall be
assisted by the appropriate Lebanese authorities).
255.
See generally Cassese, supra note 114, at 33 (providing independent expert
evaluation of resources available to the principal defender at the Special Court,
highlighting its potential, and recommending certain improvements).
256.
See, e.g., Skilbeck, supra note 103, at 82 (noting that Duty Counsel could
very easily visit the defendants in the detention facility, more easily than the actual
counsel stationed abroad for instance).
257.
See id. at 81-82 (describing the possibility for useful and necessary
representation and unique innovations, in particular, introducing the writ of habeas
corpus, made by Duty Counsel at the Sierra Leone Court).
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through a joint motion or communication to the judges or other
relevant organ, rather than a motion within the context of any
individual trial. Finally, in some instances the registrar at the
tribunals deals with the health and welfare of those detained by the
tribunals, in particular, with respect to family and religious visits. In
order to guarantee that the human rights on which the legitimacy of
international criminal law depends, an adversarial interest
represented by a counselor at the Defense Office might at times be
necessary.

VII. CONCLUSION

In summary, this Article has examined the evolution of the
defense rights in international criminal tribunals. It took, as its
central problem and its point of departure, the absence of a strong
defense organ in the statutory instruments of international criminal
courts to protect defense rights since Nuremberg and Tokyo
immediately after World War II. The Article has shown that, while in
principle the defense was touted as being an equally important
partner in the processes of seeking justice for the victims of
international crimes, in practice the defense has been treated as a
second class citizen before the altar of international criminal justice.
This practice, which regrettably started under a U.S.-led military
tribunal as far back as 1945, continued for decades until the
establishment of the STL by the United Nations in 2007. In what the
author submits is a watershed moment, for the first time in the
history of international criminal law, a statute of an international
court included legal provision for a defense organ holding a status
coequal to that of the Prosecution, Chambers, and the Registry.
The Article further suggested that the impact of recognizing the
defense as an equal first class citizen could be significant if the
principles in the Statute are matched with the practice. It would
catapult the rights of defendants to a new level and help to move
international criminal law from a primitive legal system to a more
civilized legal system. Although the author applauds the Lebanon
Tribunal example as potentially offering a significant contribution to
international law and, toward that end, examines several policies and
directives in place that further guarantee the smooth operation of the
Defense Office, the Article warns of dangers that those trusted with
ensuring the implementation of the rights in that court must avoid so
as not to inadvertently surrender the principal legacy that they would
otherwise bequeath to international criminal law. As it is a truism
that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, this latest
development in the world's latest international criminal court is a
significant step forward in the global march against impunity for
serious international criminals.

